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CHAPTER ONE – An Introduction
“Our times demand a new definition of leadership – global leadership.
They demand a new constellation of international cooperation – governments,
civil society, and the private sector, working together for the collective global
good” (United Nations 2009).
This statement by United Nations’ Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon at the 2009 World
Economic Forum heralded a shift in international relations from a state-centered
approach to a recognition of the growing influence of non-state actors.
In recent decades, global civil society actors have emerged as important players in
global governance. Global civil society has elevated the international policy agenda
profile of human rights, women’s rights, and environmental concerns (O'Brien, Goetz
and Scholte 2000, Reitan 2007). Global civil society campaigns have overcome the
objections of powerful state actors, including the United States, to establish the
International Criminal Court and the Mine Ban Treaty (English 1998, Short 1999,
Davenport 2003). Global civil society activists have also successfully opposed
unfavorable policies, putting a halt to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD) Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and stopping the
progress of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Development Round (Smith
and Johnson 2002). These notable successes demonstrate the need for a better
understanding of global civil society’s motives and its role in international public policy.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY LANDSCAPE
What is civil society and can it be global? The idea of civil society is useful not
because it identifies a specific type of human interaction, but because it defines the space
in which people engage individually and collectively to protest, negotiate, deliberate, and
6 |Hosto-Marti

collaborate on a wide range of social, economic and political issues (de Tocqueville 2000
[1835], Kaldor 2003, Bartelson 2006, Jad 2007, Edwards 2011). While distinct from
both government and the market, civil society regularly interacting with both (Habermas
2001). The idea of civil society developed within the conceptual framework of the nationstate, relying on its relationships with the government institutions and the market to
provide both context and legitimacy (Hall 1995, Perez-Diaz 1995, Giner 1995). Some
scholars maintain that once divorced from the nation-state the concept, of global civil
society, is “a greater distraction than aid to undstanding the world in which we live”
(Thomas 1998, 62). However, intrepreting civil society globally does not require
isolating it from governmental or maket forces, but acknowledging that these forces have
already transended national boundaries. Likewise, civil society needs to be freed from
national boundaries.
Global civil society describes the same discursive sphere of activity as domestic
civil society. The shift is more a matter of scope than of substance. The activities of
global civil society and domestic civil society are comprised of the interaction between
pressure groups and policy makers, only the scale of the policy debated changes. The
adoption of the Landmine Ban Treaty and the creation of the International Criminal Court
signifies that global civil society is able to move beyond rhetoric and exert its influence
on the global stage along side unquestioned powers such as nation-states and
multinational corporations (Kumar 2007, 431).
Framing global civil society as an arena of discourse and action emphasizes that
the whole is more than the sum of its parts. However, such a broad concept complicates
analysis. Much as ecologist gain insight about an ecosystem by studying its inhabitants,
7 |Hosto-Marti

the current study seeks to understand global civil society by analyzing the effects of
political and economic globalization on international nongovernmental organizations
(INGOs) as inhabitants of global civil society. The United Nations and the Union of
International Associations (UIA) define INGOs as not-for-profit voluntary citizen groups,
which operated in at least two countries, to address issues in support of the common good
(United Nations 2015). These best-documented inhabitants of global civil society provide
a medium for understanding the multifaceted concept of global civil society.
In various forms global civil society has always existed. World War II
emphasized the dangers of indifferent and isolationist public policies. Nation-states
realized that interdependence and collaboration could make the world safer and more
prosperous. This climate of cooperation promoted the advancement of global civil
society. Since the 1950’s the number of INGOs has grown rapidly, both bolstering and
being bolstered by globalization (Carothers 1999).
Across the globe the number of INGOs has increased exponentially since the
middle of the twentieth century. Prior to 1954, the total number of INGOs was less than
500. By the end of the 1980s, the number of INGOs expanded to nearly 100,000. In the
first decade of the twenty-first century, the INGO population doubled reaching more than
200,000 INGOs by 2011 (Union of International Associations 2012). Pronounced spikes
in the growth of INGOs accompanied major changes in international political landscape.
In the 1970s, decolonization produced an uptick in the number of INGOS as new nations
emerged. Another spike occurred in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The turn of the century, following the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in
Seattle designated a marked recovery in the number of INGOs globally. (Figure 1)
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FIGURE 1

Source: Union of International Associations

The expansion of INGOs has not occurred in isolation but during a period of rapid
globalization. Globalization, defined as “the stretching of social, political, and economic
activities across frontiers such that events, decisions, and activities in one region of the
world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions
of the globe” (Held, McGrew, et al. 2000, 69), has considerably reduced the costs of
cooperation. Waves of democratization empower people to exercise new freedoms of
expression and association. Technological advances make it possible to communicate
across continents as easily as communicating across the dinner table. Economic growth
has reduced the cost of technological advancements, making them available to more
people. The current study seeks to identify which global forces promote global civil
society and which forces impede its progress, thereby enhancing our understanding of the
ramifications of greater global civil society involvement in public policy.
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Global civil society is truly global. INGOs are active in every country, even the
most isolated. In 2013, the World Policy Institute identified the ten most isolated
countries based on the following five criteria: direct flights to other countries, internet
connectivity, tourism, immigrant population, and imports. Korea DPR, Myanmar,
Madagascar, Somalia, and Burundi make up the top five (World Policy Institute 2013).
While these countries have relatively small numbers of INGOs compared with more
connected countries, four of these countries show significant growth in the number of
INGOS especially since 2000. Only Somalia, which has the smallest INGO presence
experienced flat growth.
FIGURE 2

Source: Union of International Associations

Global civil society is largely a developed world phenomenon. However, over the
past thirty years, global civil society, as measured by the number of INGOs, has
proliferated more rapidly in middle and lower income countries. In 1985, 45% of all
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INGOs operated in just twenty-seven high-income countries including, Western Europe,
Canada, United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; by 2010, this percentage
dropped to 39%.
FIGURE 3

Source: Union of International Associations
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The map (Figure 3), illustrates the pattern of global civil society expansion. In
1985, INGOs were concentrated in Europe, North America, Japan and Australia. By
2010, we observe global increases in every country, but with more pronounced changes
in developing countries, particularly in South America, Central America, and Southeast
Asia. We also observe smaller, yet substantial increases in Africa. These observations
highlight the influence of differences in income levels and geographic location on the
number of INGOs, but what other factors explain the variation in the growth in the
numbers of INGOs.
Scholars have proffered numerous explanations for globalization’s effect on the
growth in the number of INGOs and global civil society’s scope and influence. They
have suggested causal relationships among the proliferation of democratically governed
nations (Boli and Thomas 1999, J. Smith 1998, Omelicheva 2009, Chandhoke 2009), the
expansion of international cooperation through governance regimes (Edwards and Hulme
2013, Fowler 2011, O'Brien, Goetz and Scholte 2000), the increased interconnectedness
of the world economy, and the ease of movement of information across the globe
(Glasius and Players 2013, Castells, et al. 2006). The majority of civil society scholars
substantiate these relationships with case study based evidence. While these studies
provide insight into specific global civil society activities, they lack the rigor to
generalize these theoretical assumptions to a wider population of global civil society
actors.
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FIGURE 4

Growth In Average Indicators 1983-2011
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The similarity in the trend lines of these forces of globalization would seem to
support relationships between these variables and INGO growth (Figure 4). However,
these relationships remain untested. In addition, the lack of concurrent testing of these
anticipated relationships makes it difficult to determine if the similarities in growth
patterns are discrete or the result of a common intervening variable. The current study
closes these research gaps by analyzing all four competing explanations in one study.
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GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY
The first explanation examined by the current study is the perceived relationship
between the proliferation of democratic forms of government and global civil society.
This explanation gains support from democratization theory, which measures democracy,
at least in part, by a citizen’s ability to freely associate and individually or collectively
appeal to political leaders and institutions (Dahl 1971).
The democratic governance explanation envisions global civil society as
populated by organizations which serve as schools of democracy. Such organizations
facilitate the gathering of information on policy options, the formation of policy
preferences, and the expression of those policy preferences to public officials (Fung and
Wright 2001). These organizations also provide citizens with the opportunity to learn
leadership and legislative skills (Baiocchi 2001).
The literature is mixed on the causal direction of the relationship between
democracy and a thriving global civil society. Some scholars focus on the prerequisite of
basic civil liberties and the rule of law to foster a vibrant global civil society (Carroll and
Carroll 2004). Other scholars examine the ability of global civil society to promote and
sustain democratic transitions (Przeworski 2004, Linz and Stepan 1996). The current
study test two reciprocal hypotheses in an attept to establish a causal direction.
The first democracy hypothesis proposes that as a country moves from autocracy
toward democracy the number of INGOs will increase. The premise of this explanation
of global civil society growth is that once citizens are free to assemble, act collectively,
and engage with their government, without fear of reprisal or repression, they will.
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INGOs organize and amplify individual desires to express political views and to seek
policy outcomes that align with those views (Ehrenberg 1999, Habermas 2001, de
Tocqueville 2000 [1835]). We should expect this civic engagement to foster political
participation.
The reciprocal democracy hypothesis states that INGOs operating in a country
will support and stabilize democratic traditions and institutions thus enabling a country to
move closer to democracy. This hypothesis assumes that INGOs increase the political
participation, especially of marginalized groups by training citizens in democratic
principles, thereby stimulating and emboldening democratic transitions (O'Donnell and
Schmitter 1986, Linz and Stepan 1996). Global civil society’s support of democratic
principles and institutions is observable at the international level.
Democracy theory presumes that global civil society has the ability to make
global governance more democratic. According to this explanation, INGOs are conduits
for learning the philosophies and methods of democracy (Boli and Thomas 1999). Also,
INGOs reduce the personal and social costs of political participation by facilitating access
to information while enhancing solidarity (Sorensen and Torfing 2005). Chapter three
provides a thorough analysis of the relationship between democratic governance and the
growth of global civil society.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The next relationship investigated, by the current study, is between a thriving
global civil society and international political integration. Political integration is a
measure of how invested a country is in the international political system. In other
15 |Hosto-Marti

words, to what extent does a country participate in international government
organizations or sign and adopt international treaties. This explanation finds support in
the principles of new public management, which maintains that public/private
partnerships can mitigate the deficiencies in public bureaucracy, making participation in
the international policy arena easier (Milward and Provan 2000). The present study
hypothesizes that nations active in the international political system will have a larger
global civil society presence. When countries face increased administrative
responsibility, they will seek to partner with global civil society actors to meet those
administrative burdens (Edwards 2011, Tvedt, 2002, Fowler 1998).
The political integration explanation conceives of global civil society as
comprised of actors whose primary purpose is to deliver responsive and efficient public
services. According to this theory, when INGOs increase participant buy-in, global
governance becomes more responsive. Advocates of this approach cite the upsurge in the
use of INGOs to administer international aid programs as an illustration of this phase of
global governance (Fredericksen and London 2000). Chapter four provides a thorough
analysis of the relationship between political integration and the growth of global civil
society.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The third relationship explored by the present study is the relationship between
economic integration and a dynamic global civil society. Economic integration is a
measure of how much a country’s economy depends on trade or foreign investment. This
relationship is based on the work of two distinct groups of economic scholars. Neoliberal
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scholars analyze civil society through the lens of supply and demand, (Steinberg 2006) by
contrast, alternative development scholars analyze civil society through the lens of
economic self-determination (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, Evans 2008). Both of these
groups identify the origins of civil society as arising from the separation of political life
from both commerce and labor (Boyd 2013).
The neoliberal economic approach focuses on global civil society’s ability to
mitigate market failures. Global civil society is most effective at correcting three specific
types of market failure: the provision of public goods, contract failure, and an outlet for
philanthropic demand (Salamon and Anhier 1998, Teegen, Doh and Vachani 2004).
Since global civil society organizations are exempt from the drive to maximize profits,
they can meet the demand for public goods, which have nonexistent or low profit
margins. Examples of public goods frequently provided by global civil society
organizations include delivering healthcare to the poor or subsidizing cultural activities.
Global civil society actors help mitigate contract failure, not by enforcing the
legal fine print, but instead monitoring companies’ commitment to their loftier
obligations of honesty and transparency. For example, watchdog organizations invest the
time and effort necessary to determine if Starbuck’s coffee is traded fairly or if Nike
shoes are manufactured in sweatshops. Global civil society actors attempt to empower
consumers to make informed choices.
Lastly, global civil society also provides a market for the expression of
philanthropic impulses. Classic economic theory cannot explain why someone would
willingly work without compensation or give money away without expecting a return
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(Hansmann 1987). The market is incapable of creating institutions that direct these
behaviors – civil society fills that gap both nationally and globally.
Alternative development scholars draw support from Karl Polanyi’s double
movement theory, which explains that social pressures arise when the state becomes too
enmeshed with business interests and fails to buffer citizens from negative externalities of
market activities (Polanyi [1944] 2001). For example, when a government fails to
regulate pollution adequately for fear of losing industry to a neighboring country with
weaker environmental protections, global civil society can empower people to demand a
healthy environment through public awareness campaigns and protests. As a country
integrates into the global free-market economy, its economic policy autonomy, as well as
its ability to buffer citizens from the negative impacts of market force, is reduced. This
lack of government responsiveness will lead to an increased number of INGOs as society
organizes to challenge the state’s relationship to business interests (Caporaso and Tarrow
2009).
These two seemingly incompatible approaches to understanding economic
integration are measured by the same variables – trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows, both measured as a percent of GDP. Not only do these economic
activities require interaction with other countries, but they often come with specific rules
of engagement, which limit the policy choices. Chapter five provides a thorough analysis
of the relationship between economic integration and the growth of global civil society.
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GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND NATIONAL CAPACITY
The national capacity explanation predicts that a particular level of national
capacity is essential for supporting global civil society. Modernization theory validates
the national capacity relationship. Modernization theory predicts that industrialization
and economic development lead directly to positive social and political changes. Global
civil society is an example of one of the anticipated changes (Lipset 1981).
According to modernization theory, economic advancements, particularly the
division of labor, will free up both time and treasure that can be invested in pursuits
beyond subsistence. In a modernized economy a larger proportion of the population has
the leisure time and wealth to devote to civic engagement. National capacity is a measure
of the material resources and technological capability available to a country to support
global civil society organizations. The current study will measure modernization in terms
of wealth, access to technology, social capital index (life expectancy, educational
attainment), and the size of urban population.
The hypotheses generated by the national capacity explanation predict that as the
resources available to support global civil society increase the number of INGOs
operating in that country will likewise increase. There is a logical connection between
wealth and global civil society because global civil society organizations rely heavily on
contributions or grants to fund activities (Edwards 2011). The higher the number of
people whose income exceeds their basic needs, the greater the resources available to
support global civil society organizations.
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Access to technology can positively influence the promotion of global civil
society by reducing the costs of collective action. The proliferation of the internet and
mobile phone usage allows people to access a vast array of information for pennies at any
time of the day or night. For example, the successful campaign to stop the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment at the OECD used the internet to coordinate massive protests
and direct mail campaigns in just a few days (Reitan 2007). Chapter six provides a
thorough analysis of the relationship between national capacity and the growth of global
civil society.
RESEARCH QUESTION
The premise of this research project is that by understanding which international
forces contribute to global civil society’s growth, as measured by the number of INGOs,
we can better understand the motives of global civil society organizations. As our world
becomes more interconnected and our problems become more pervasive, the solutions
needed to address these problems must become more holistic. If we are to encourage the
international policy process to become more representative, we need to understand what
motivates these new actors.
As discussed earlier, the literature identifies four competing explanations for the
exponential growth of global civil society: democratization, enhanced political
integration, increased economic integration, and modernization. The validity of these
explanations has not been tested. The present study fills this gap in the literature, by
selecting a 29 year panel regression analysis to evaluate the predictive powers of each
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competing explanations. Chapter two provides a comprehensive explanation of the data
selection and methodology.
The findings presented in this paper provide support to the idea that global civil
society has democratic foundations. Global civil society also has a strong relationship to
political integration and national capacity. The results of the current study finds little
support for the relationship between global civil society and economic integration. The
political integration relationship is open to interpretation. The optimistic interpretation
casts global civil society as a facilitator of increased participation, helping marginalized
populations influence policy decisions that impact their lives. The pessimistic perception
questions the loyalties of global civil society actors. To whom are these organizations
accountable – the marginalized populations they claim to serve or the donor countries
who pay the bills? Reality lies somewhere between these extremes, but the findings are
enough to encourage due diligence when vetting organizations for participation in the
international policy process.
Based on the results national capacity can also encourage global civil society
growth. However, the impact of national capacity diminishes over time. The same level
increase in wealth and technology produces larger increases in the number of INGOs in
lower income countries than more wealthy countries.
The current study found limited support for the economic integration explanation.
These results are interesting because much of the case study literature explores global
civil society’s efforts to alter the global economy. While many global civil society
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organization’s mission address issues of economic integration, economic globalization
offers little to explain global civil society’s rapid growth and expansion.
These results confirm that the similarity in growth trends observed between
globalization and global civil society expansion is not a spurious one. Instead it is the
result of substantive causal relationships. These results further indicate that much of
global civil society’s growth can be attributed to the expansion in global governance
institutions and regimes. While global civil society can claim roots in a democratic
impulse, its exponential growth is related to the more practical concern of public
administration.
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CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY
The study of global civil society is a relatively new field. Most of the research
has occurred in the past fifty years. Scholars from diverse academic fields, including
sociology, political science, international relations, and economics, have all attempted to
understand this emerging phenomenon, producing a wealth of scholarly literature. This
chapter provides a review of the literature focusing on the quantitative study of global
civil society. It also includes a detailed explanation of panel regression method and the
three models used to assess the four competing explanations.
Several studies influenced the methodology of this research project. The work of
Hagai Katz (2006) and Thomas and Boli (1999) guided the current study’s research
question and hypotheses. The work by the Center for Civil Society Studies at Johns
Hopkins University and Helmut Anheier guided variable selection and measurement. The
research conducted by Smith and Wiest (Smith and Wiest 2005). Informed the scope and
scale of the present study and provided additional support for variable selection. Lastly,
the current study’s overall structure was influenced by a 2010 study by Lee (Lee 2010).
Both studies use similar data and methods of analysis to explore the growth in INGOs,
but specify globalization from different perspectives.
METHODOLOGY - Literature Review
The research conducted by Katz used network analysis to map the links between
10,001 activist INGOs. Katz tested two competing models based on Gramscian theory of
civil society. The basis of Gramscian theory, as applied to global civil society, is that
social movements could serve two contradictory functions. They can, willingly or
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through cooptation, serve the existing power structure (hegemonic), or they can sustain
an alternative power structure (counter hegemonic).
Katz’s study concluded that the observed network relationships offer partial
support for both the hegemonic and counter hegemonic models of Gramscian theory. He
concluded that global civil society was in a transitional phase. The concentration of
INGO networks in high-income countries support a hegemonic interpretation of global
civil society, in contrast the rapidly growing and highly integrated links between activist
INGO networks in developing countries support a counter-hegemonic understanding of
global civil society (Katz 2006). Global civil society infrastructure has the potential to
support a slowly emerging counter-hegemonic global civil society.
Katz’s study prompted this question, what should the geographic distribution of
global civil society look like based on the prediction of each of the four selected
theoretical approaches? For example, do countries active in global governance regimes
indeed have a stronger global civil society presence than more politically isolated
countries? To test each approach the current study expanded the definition of global civil
society beyond activist INGOs, as well as gathered data over time.
Boli and Thomas’s 1999 study, employed both longitudinal and cross-sectional
analysis to explore the relationship between globalization and INGO proliferation.
However, they reversed the direction of the causality between INGOs and globalization
(Boli and Thomas 1999). Instead of assuming that globalization created an environment
conducive to global civil society expansion, Boli and Thomas hypothesize that global
civil society created the indispensable environment for the dissemination of shared
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values, norms, and practices, commonly referred to as globalization. Boli and Thomas
confirmed their hypothesis about global civil society’s ability to disseminate the shared
values essential to international cooperation by identifying significant INGO growth
across the globe especially in the developing world (Boli and Thomas 1999).
Their findings support a more constructivist explanation of global civil society
growth. Global civil society is the conduit for developing, establishing, adapting, and
disseminating values, principles, standards, and norms that form the foundation for
international cooperation (Boli and Thomas 1999). The authors developed World Polity
Theory, which considers INGOs as the physical manifestation of an emerging and
consolidating world culture (Boli and Thomas 1999).
Helmut Anheier, a prominent civil society scholar, has focused on the challenges
of defining and measuring civil society at both the national and global level. In a 2007
article Anheier observed that when we draw the conceptual boundaries of global civil
society based on normative assumptions, we limit the field’s ability to conduct unbiased
empirical research (Anheier 2007).
“At issue here is the basic distinction between global civil society as some
form of normative ideal … and global civil society as an empirical phenomenon
that can be studied using competing and evolving definitions and approaches…”
(Anheier 2007, 13).

In a 2009 study, Anheier posed the question “What kind of Nonprofit Sector,
What kind of society?” He observes three trends in civil society engagement: nonprofits
as service providers, nonprofits and social capital, and social accountability (Anheier
2009). Similarly to Boli and Thomas, Anheier theorizes that the nonprofit sector and
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society are in a mutually constructive relationship. Anheier’s research supports the
current study’s inclusive definition of global civil society, as well as the idea of
concurrent testing of four competing explanations of its growth.
The Johns Hopkins Center for Global Civil Society’s Comparative Nonprofits
Sector Project investigates national level data using a consistent methodology, which
allows for broad-based comparison between diverse countries. A 2004 book, Global Civil
Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, released the findings of a cross-sectional
comparison of 36 national studies. The intention of the Johns Hopkins’ study was to
determine how the national environment influences the operational structure of the
nonprofit sector. The most striking cross-national similarity identified, by the 2004
study, was that nonprofit sectors are major economic forces in almost every country.
Nonprofits meaningfully contribute to the gross domestic product by employing a
substantial number of people and leveraging volunteer resources (Salamon and
Sokolowski 2004).
Despite these similarities, the structure and activities of nonprofit organizations
varied greatly across countries. Nonprofits in developed countries relied more heavily on
volunteer labor, whereas nonprofits in developing countries tended to use more paid staff.
Nonprofit organizations engage in a wide variety of activities, including providing social
services, supporting art and culture, and advocating for public policy. The nature of the
relationship between the nonprofit sector and the government determined which activities
dominated in a particular country. For example, nonprofit sectors that relied heavily on
government funding engaged in far less political activism (Salamon and Sokolowski
2004).
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Another study from the Center for Global Civil Society by Lester Salamon and
Helmut Anheier tested five theories regarding the connections between social
demographics, trust in government, and public goods provision on the size and
composition of nonprofit sectors in seven industrialized countries. Their study concluded
that none of the five theories, individually, could adequately account for the variation in
the nonprofit sectors across the countries. However, the government failure/market
failure theory demonstrated the best predictive ability. The authors acknowledged that the
limited numbers of observations could have contributed to the lack of results (Salamon
and Anheier 1998). The research of the Johns Hopkins Center for Global Civil Society
provided further support for investigating the effect of social, political, and economic
forces on global civil society. Instead of comparing national nonprofit sectors, the current
study looks at the influences of governance and the market globally, expanding both the
scope and scale of the Salamon and Anheier study.
The 2005 study by Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest influenced the method of
analysis for the present study by using panel regression to explore the geographic
distribution of transnational social movement organizations. Smith and Wiest found that
countries with strong democratic traditions and high levels of integration into global
governance regimes were better represented in transnational social movements. However,
they found little support for the influence of economic integration on participation in
transnational social movements (Smith and Wiest 2005). The current study tests several
of the same theories: democratization, political integration, and economic integration, but
differs from the work of Smith and Wiest by using a more generalizable sample of global
civil society organizations and a longer research period.
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A 2010 study conducted by Teadong Lee shares numerous similarities with the
present study. His research compared the explanatory powers of the top-down (influenced
by external actors) and the bottom-up (internally motivated) perspectives of globalization
on the increase in the number of INGOs. Lee’s study looked at 126 countries, using an
eight-year panel regression of the number of INGOs. He found evidence to support both
interpretations of globalization.
Lee’s study found that a fusion of the top-down and bottom-up approaches
explain the proliferation of INGOs better than either approach separately. In addition, Lee
found that political globalization has a larger impact on the number of INGOs than
economic globalization. Consequently, countries with democratic governments and high
levels of political integration have the most active civil society, while economic
integration, as measured by trade and a country’s reliance on official development
assistance (ODA), had little influence (Lee 2010).
The present study differs from Lee’s work substantively as well as technically.
Substantively, it approaches the question of global civil society growth by assessing a
country’s position in the international political arena and the global economy. It tests four
distinct theories of political and economic globalization instead of differentiating between
globalization from above and globalization from below. The other major substantive
difference is the conceptualization of social, political, and economic pressures as truly
global forces and not an issue of national adaptation.
Technically, the current study expands the scope and scale of Lee’s research by
using a 28-year time span, thereby capturing the impacts of globally significant events
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such as the transition of former Soviet and Yugoslav states and the pursuit of the
Millennium Development Goals. In addition, it gathered data on 60 more countries
allowing for the comparison of the disparate impact of political and economic
globalization in developing countries and those already developed.
METHODOLOGY- DATA SELECTION
Research on INGOs and the global civil society they inhabit is fraught with
ambiguities and assumptions. There is little agreement about what makes an organization
“nongovernmental” and even less consensus about what makes their actions “civil”.
Scholars often use value-laden terminology and supportive theories to highlighting some
organizations while excluding others. As a result of these biases, scholars claiming to
study the same phenomenon end up selecting samples from profoundly different
populations. This lack of common ground has limited global-scale analysis and frustrated
the sharing of scholarship across disciplines.
If we limit our discussion of civil society only to those organizations we consider
to be “civilized” or those that conform to some predetermined normative value, then it is
easy to overlook a broad spectrum of collective action. This oversight could encourage
scholars to champion civil society without fully appreciating all of its ramifications
(Amoore and Langley 2004). The present study contributes to the establishment of a
common ground by testing the theories underlying many of the normative assumptions
employed by the various disciplines.
The current study uses an inclusive definition for global civil society and broadly
identifies an INGO as a not-for-profit voluntary citizen group that operates in at least two
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countries in order address issues in support of the public good (UIA 2012; UN 1945).
This definition establishes a consistent unit of measurement free from national variances
in nonprofit certifications.
The use of such a broad definition has its strengths and weaknesses. A strength is
that the sample selected contains a diverse assortment of INGOs including Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the World Chess Federation, the Catholic
Church, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the International Dance Organization.
This diversity makes it possible to test the generalizability of the four competing
explanations. However, this inclusive definition sacrifices some detail to gain
generalizability – it is unlikely that all the types of INGOs presented above will respond
to globalization in the same way. A weakness is that this definition produces a bias
toward formal organizations, or those organizations that have a legal presence. Such
organizations are more likely to report their information to the UIA. However, this
weakness is not too harmful. Since the purpose of the current study is to analyze civil
society on a global scale, a bias in favor of organization with the resource to act at the
global level contributes to the validity of the research.
The INGO count for all three models comes from annual censuses conducted by
the UIA, which has been compiling and disseminating information on international
organizations since 1907. Each year the UIA compiles and edits self-reported
organization descriptions. The average response rate is 35%, ensuring highly reliable
data. Information from websites, annual reports, and newsletters supplement the
organization descriptions. (Union of International Associations 2012) This vast collection
of information is published in the Yearbook of International Organizations.
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UIA tracks INGO activity in 354 countries, territories, and disputed regions. To
insure consistency in measurement the number of countries was reduced to 195. As a
result of pairwise grouping 122 countries are included in the regression models. The vast
majority of territories and disputed regions (212) were omitted. Another twenty countries
were excluded due to a lack of data on all salient variables1. Geopolitical shifts during
this timeframe have caused several countries either come into existence or cease to exist,
resulting in substantive missing data in certain years. 2
In addition to providing the data for the dependent variable, the UIA also provides
the data for the independent variable -number of IGOs (Union of International
Associations 2012). Data for treaties signed came from the United Nations Treaty
Collection (United Nations 2013). The data for all other independent variables came
from the World Bank’s Global Economic Indicators.
The collection of data for both the dependent and descriptive variables is
inherently biased against lower income countries. National wealth dictates the data
available; less developed countries have fewer resources to devote to curating and

1

Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Curacao, Faeroe Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Korea DPR, Marshall
Islands, Mayotte, Monaco, Palau, San Marino, Sao Tome – Principe, St. Martin, Timor-Leste, Turks-Caicos,
Tuvalu, Virgin Islands
2
German Reunification in 1990, the data for the German DR covers only 1983-1990, while data coded as
Germany includes data from the former FRG. The Union of Soviet Socialists Republics dissolves in 1991
creating 15 new countries: Belarus (semi-autonomous status data year 83-11) (data years 92-11) Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia data includes prior to
1992 USSR, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. In 1991 Yugoslavia (data years 1983-2007)
descended into warfare, several new nations finally emerged. Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia have data
covering the years of 1992-20011. Bosnia-Herzegovina has data from 1993-2011. Montenegro has data
from 2003-2006 as reported as Serbia-Montenegro and 2006-2011 as just Montenegro. Kosovo has data
covering the years of 2009-2011. Serbia has spotty data, but covers the years of 92-98 and 2003-2011.
In 1993 Czechoslovakia (data years 83-93) separated into two countries: the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic.
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reporting of national data. In addition, GDP has a significant impact on how the data
interrelates. GDP is correlated to several other descriptive variables, but not to an extent
that it jeopardizes the quality of the analysis. A regression pre-test identified that GDP
alone, could explain 95% of the variation in global civil society geographic distribution.
The current study corrects for the bias in the data by formulating three models based on
national wealth. These three models allow for concurrent testing of the theories, while
providing the ability to compare results across income levels without the added
complication of interactive variables.
The dataset initially collected 5385 country-year observations of the dependent
variable. The dataset produces unbalanced panels. The use of pairwise groupings
preserves the most information, yet some observations are excluded from the models. The
first model is the inclusive model (INC), which analyzed 2761 country-year observations
regardless of income level. This model includes the most diverse sample of countries the
data will allow. This model includes wealthy countries and poor countries, urbanized
countries and rural countries, engaged countries and isolated countries, yet these
dissimilar countries all participate in global civil society to one degree or another.
The second model focuses on wealthy developed countries. The high income
country model (HIC) includes countries classified annually as either high income or
upper middle income countries by the World Bank. This model analyzed 1402 countryyear observations.
The third model concentrates on lower income developing countries. The low
income country model (LIC) includes countries designated annually as middle income,
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low middle income, low income, and least developed countries by the World Bank. The
LIC analyzed 2255 country-year observations.
Some countries moved between income categories. The movement of countries
between categories is the result of economic changes in each country as well as a shift in
the Atlas gross national income (GNI) levels used by the World Bank in a given year.
These three models will allow for concurrent testing of the theories, while providing the
ability to compare results across income levels. The purpose of these income-specific
models is to determine if these global factors have a similar effect on countries at
different stages of economic development.
For the sake of clarity, this study represents the INGO count as a whole number
and not a ratio, normalized by population. It controls for the effects of population by
including it as a descriptive variable in every model. Population is statistically significant
in all three models. A 1% increase in population produces a 17% increase in INGOs in
the inclusive model, a 9% increase in the high income country model, and a 17% increase
in the low income country model.
METHODOLOGY – METHOD OF ANALYSIS
This study uses a 29-year panel regression of 122 countries to identify
relationships between economic, political, and technological characteristics for each
country and the number of the INGOs active in each country. This method of analysis is
useful since it allows for the exploration of the relationship between the growth in the
number of INGOs and the specific globalization measures, not only across time but also
cross-nationally. The 29-year timeframe allows for adequate observation of longitudinal
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changes and includes the two most recent growth spikes in 1992 and at the turn of the
twenty-first century.
Panel data analysis relies on several assumptions regarding error terms to ensure
reliability. The first is a constant error variance of error terms. In other words the
predicted value of the explanatory variable is not linked to the predicted errors; the errors
do not increase or decrease together. Secondly, there is no serial correlation. In other
words, the error in one country-year observation is not influenced by the error in previous
observations. Thirdly, there is no spatial correlation. That means the error terms in one
country vary independently from errors in every other country in the current study. When
the data violate these assumptions, the analysis can predict false positive relationships
(Beck and Katz 1995). To summarize panel data analysis assumes that observations are
independent.
International relations datasets do not easily meet these assumptions. Large scale,
long term, fixed unit datasets, such as the one used in the current study, tend to violate
these assumptions. First, these studies frequently observe durable phenomena. INGOs
tend to have a life span longer than one year; as a result the number of INGOs in a
country in any one year will be similar to the number of INGOs in that country in
subsequent years, regardless of global influences. Secondly, countries are neither truly
independent nor unique. Any study of globalization rests on the assumption that nations
interact and influence one another. Whether connected by a common language, religion,
trade relations, political alliances, or geographic proximity, it is reasonable to expect
country cohorts to respond to globalization in similar ways.
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The current study uses a panel corrected standard errors regression to correct for
the inherent incompatibilities between the data and regular panel regression analysis.
Developed by Beck and Katz, the process generates standardized errors “so the variance
and covariance of the errors are proportional to the corresponding variance and
covariance of the independent variable” (Beck and Katz 1995, 641). The panel corrected
standard errors method produces more reliable results without sacrificing observations to
lagged data or robust regressions (Johnson 2004).
This analysis is not trying to assess the outcome of a specific intervention, but to
identify general relationships between the descriptive variables and the dependent
variable (number of INGOs). As a result, random effects analysis was used in the
research, allowing the models to reflect the full variance in the dependent variable based
on the influence of each descriptive variable.
This study also must address the issue of error correlation. Globalization is a
complex and interconnected process. As a result, many of the measures used to quantify
its influence are also related. National income, as measured by GDP per capita, is
correlated with other explanatory variables such as social development, technology, and
urbanization. (See Appendix) Correlation increases the likelihood of false negative
results by siphoning off some of the explanatory power of related variables. Since the
literature anticipates a strong relationship between national wealth and size of global civil
society, as measured by the number of INGOs, it is essential to include GDP per capita in
all three regression models. The inclusion of GDP per capita increases the confidence in
the statistically significant identified relationships. In other words, if the analysis
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discovers a relationship between technology and INGO growth, that relationship must
therefore be robust to overcome the explanatory power of income.
The time span covered by this study contains several historical events of global
significance, such as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia;
as well as the adoption and pursuit of the United Nations’ Millennium Development
Goals. The literature predicts that these events influenced global civil society’s
development. This study includes year dummy variables to identify year-specific shocks.3
SUMMARY
In conclusion, the diverse field of global civil society studies benefits from the
rigorous testing of the assumptions behind the prevailing explanations for global civil
society expansion. The analysis presented here is a step toward establishing common
ground by providing a foundation for increased collaboration and coordination across the
varied disciplines. Panel regression analysis provides the best tool for testing these
hypothesized relationships. This study developed three models to control for the
overarching influence of national wealth on global civil society expansion to ensure that
developed country trends did not overshadow changes in developing countries. The
results presented in the following chapters support for the accretions that democratic

3

The following year is significant in all three models – 1992. This year is also substantively significant
since it marks the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This small decrease is likely the
result of changes in number of countries with data as opposed to a meaningful change in the distribution
of global civil society for that year.
The following years are significant in the inclusive model – 1986, 2009-2010. The small decrease in 1986
is also seen in figure 1 indicating that it is likely a sampling anomaly, since no substantive event occurred
that year to justify another interpretation. The small increase observed in 2009-2010 does have a
possible substantive explanation. These years mark the beginning of the “great recession;” global civil
society could have been mobilizing to meet the increased demands of this economic downturn.
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governance, political integration, and national capacity promote global civil society
growth, as measured by the number of INGOs. However, the results offer less support
for a strong relationship between political integration and global civil society expansion.
The full model results are reported in the appendix.
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CHAPTER THREE – Global Civil Society and Democracy
The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF) was established in 2005 to fund
civil society organizations providing democratic training in emerging democracies
(United Nations 2005). What better place to support a democratic transition than
Myanmar? After decades of military rule, in 2011 Myanmar took its first tentative steps
toward democracy. One of the first civil society efforts to teach political skills was
Debate Education for Democracy. Debate Education for Democracy believes that
learning how to debate would allow youth to develop their critical thinking skills and
encourage them to stand up for their rights. This project has conducted training sessions
in six regions of Myanmar and created a public space for the sharing and discussion of
ideas (United Nations 2015). A documentary clip highlighting the work of Debate
Education for Democracy illustrated the impact of even this small program. A recent
debate competition brought together more than 130 youth and was attended by hundreds
of spectators. One of the program’s trainers and first time voter stated that his work with
Debate Education for Democracy gave him hope for democracy in Myanmar (United
Nations Democracy Fund 2015).
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: LITERATURE REVIEW
Global civil society traces its origins back to the Greeks and Romans. Classically,
civil society and the state were inseparable. Civil society was how man escaped savagery
by organizing political, economic, and social life into a unified whole.
“There is then in all persons a natural impetus to associate with each other in this
manner, and he who first founded civil society was the cause of the greatest good”
(Aristole 1921, Politics: Book 1 Ch II, 295).
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Enlightenment scholars refined the concept of civil society by introducing the
idea of the social contract. Citizens can voluntarily choose to participate in civil society.
For Locke and Rousseau civil society was a contractually produced and politically
guaranteed instrument empowering people to attain security cooperatively and protect
public property.
“The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on
the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another,
in a secure enjoyment of their property” (Locke 1980 [1690], VIII:95).

It was not until the 19th century that scholars theorized a more distant relationship
between the state and civil society. The American and French revolution redefined
citizenship, changing the relationship of the governed to government. Citizens claimed
the right to participate actively in governing. Civil society became a sphere of
intermediate associations that intercedes between the individual and the state.
“The people, instructed in their true interests, would understand that to profit
from society’s benefits, one must submit to its burdens. The free association of
individuals could then replace the individual power of nobles, and the state would
be sheltered from both tyranny and license” (de Tocqueville 2000 [1835], Volume
I Introduction 9).
These mediating groups served as training grounds for governing skill and as a conduit
for the formulation and expression of political preferences (Ehrenberg 1999, Elliott 2003,
de Tocqueville 2000 [1835], Madison 1787).
To understand the contemporary uses of the term global civil society fully, we
must also address the concept of pluralism. Pluralism assumes that groups are the
principle units of political life. Pluralism offers an alternative to leadership by elites,
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theorizing that to understand politics you must examine the collective actions and
preferences of groups (Truman 1951, Meyer and Lupo 2007).
“Pluralism’s central project was explaining how private interests can be organized
and expressed without the destabilizing politics of social class. Private desires …
are “aggregated” by interest groups, voluntary associations, political parties, and
parliaments and represented to appropriate governmental elites for adjudication
and compromise. Intermediate bodies and overlapping forms of membership
become a defining quality of modernization as intellectuals proclaimed the end of
ideology and explained how citizens’ apathy could enable elites to lead mass
societies in conditions of social reform and political stability. A consumer society
without historic parallel was taking shape in the United States, and pluralism
helped lower the temperature as it demonstrated how nonpolitical interests could
serve social integration” (Ehrenberg 1999, 200).
The relationship between global civil society and democracy is reciprocal. To
flourish civil society requires at least basic associational freedom provided by democratic
governance. In return, democracy becomes more robust through the active participation
of citizens facilitated by civil society. Democracy has become the gold standard for good
governance. Failure to embrace this global norm can result in sanctions by or even
exclusion from the wider international community (Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008). A
robust global civil society can encourage the formation and enhance the stability of
democratic governance at both the national as well as the transnational level. “…Chances
for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a
number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations” (Lipset 1981, 77).
What is democracy exactly? At its most basic, democracy is government ruled by
the people in pursuit of the public good. This definition contains several contested
concepts: direct rule and public good. First, direct rule by the people is easier to imagine
than to implement. Secondly, what constitutes the public good is open to interpretation.
For the sake of observational consistency, scholars have simplified the idea of democracy
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to include, at the bare minimum, the people’s ability to express their approval or
disapproval of the actions of government through competitive elections (Schumpeter
1942).
At the heart of democracy is the idea that the governed participate freely, openly,
and as equals in the selection of government officials. Robert Dahl in his classic work
identified the following three necessary conditions for democracy: first, that the governed
be able to form preferences; second, that the governed be able to signify these
preferences both individually and collectively; and third, that these preferences carry
equal influence in the process of governing. To this end, Dahl further identified the
freedom to found and join organizations as one of the eight guarantees for democratic
institutions (Dahl 1971). Civil society organizations facilitate the process of preference
formulation and expression, thereby enabling government to respond to these demands.
(Carroll and Carroll 2004).
Civil society activities are not limited to the confines of the nation-state, but
transcend political boundaries promoting political participation at the national, as well as
transnational, level. Recognizing political engagement beyond national boundaries,
requires a conceptualization of democracy outside the confines of the nation-state.
Globalization is altering the characterizations of democracy and national
sovereignty. National communities no longer make decisions and policy in isolation, nor
do national policy decisions affect only those living with in that country’s borders. For
example, the decision to increase interest rates to counter inflation may seem to be only a
domestic policy; however, due to the interconnectedness of the financial network, such a
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decision has economic ramifications in other countries. “The possibility of democracy
today must be, in short, linked to an expanding framework of democratic states and
agencies” (Held 1995, 106). The cosmopolitan definition of democracy relies on the
principle of autonomy not citizenship.
“Persons should enjoy equal rights and accordingly equal obligations in the
specification of the political framework … of deliberation about the conditions of
their own lives and in the determination of these conditions, so long as they do not
deploy this framework to negate the rights of others” (Held 2006, 264).

The principle of autonomy achieves its full potential through the “double
democratization” of both the state and civil society (Held 2006, 276). Both spheres of
public life must work cooperatively to ensure open participation in public discourse. In
addition, both spheres must insure transparency in their actions to curb potential excesses.
Removing democracy from the confines of the state raises accountability questions.
Global civil society has been suggested as a way to ease democracy’s transition beyond
the nation-state borders (Miszlivetz and Jensen 2013).
Democratic values and institutions spread rapidly following the end of World War
II. In 1946, there were approximately twenty democratic nations; by 2010, there were
nearly 100 (Center for Systemic Peace 2014). Huntington’s influential work identifies
three distinct waves of democratization between 1828 and the late 1980s. These waves
marked sea changes in the global political environment, facilitating the formation and
stabilization of democratic governments (Huntington 1991).
Scholars have expanded on Huntington’s work to include the tidal wave of
democratization that accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the rippling
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effects of the Arab Spring (Glasius 2012, Glasius and Players 2013). Regardless of where
you draw the dates, the key premise remains unchanged. Both internal and external
factors affect a country’s ability to achieve and maintain democratic governance
(Doorenspleet 2000).
According to this research, specific structural conditions make the adoption of
democratic principles more likely. These conditions include the following: an
industrialized economy, freedom of association, high levels of literacy, urbanization, and
relative economic equality (Huntington 1991, Przeworski 2004, Doorenspleet and
Kopecky 2008). The regional and global political climates can facilitate or impede a
country’s realization of its democratic potential. Regionally, the level of political and
social stability, as well as democratic governance of neighboring countries, impacts the
democratizing progress (Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008). Globally, wars and
decolonization can impose democratization on a country (Huntington 1991). The current
study investigates how global civil society mediates between internal democratic
potential and the international political climate.
During the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, civil society plays a
pivotal role. Civil society is a necessary, yet insufficient, condition for the transition from
authoritarian to democratic governing.
“A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to
monitor government and state can help transitions get started, help resist
reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help
deepen democracy. At all stages of the democratic process, therefore, a lively and
independent civil society is invaluable” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 9).
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Global civil society empowers people to test the boundaries established by governments
and reclaim the public space. Global civil society leverages moral authority, earned by
their consistent opposition to the authoritarian regime, to foster openness and resist
backsliding (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
What can be learned from the most recent “fourth” wave of democratic transitions
about the democratizing potential of global civil society? Based on a review of Eastern
European dissidents’ writings, Glasius identifies three attributes of civil society that
enabled it to facilitate the transition process: solidarity, transparency, and pluralism.
Solidarity manifests as a sense of shared identity or shared grievances. Global civil
society provides the venue for people to connect based on shared views and policy
preferences regardless of ethnicity or religious distinctions. Transparency, in the words of
Vaclav Havel, is about “live[ing] in the truth”, (Glasius 2012, 350) in other words,
emphasizes civil society’s ability to make the actions of government and society open to
evaluation. Civil society distributes information to an ever-widening circle of
stakeholders (Glasius 2012).
In the aftermath of World War II, victorious nations led by the United States set
about establishing the institutional framework for a new world order. These new
international institutions were empowered to counteract the nationalistic excesses and
secretive alliances that precipitated both world wars. Democracy gained prominence as
the preferred mode of governing not because it insures perfect agreement on diverse
values, but because it offers the best framework for evaluating competing values through
an open public process (Held 2006, 261).
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These international institutions embedded full employment and free markets as
principles of democratic governance and national sovereignty (Ruggie 1983, Bernstein
2007). Global civil society performs a necessary function in the spread of democracy by
facilitating the creation, dissemination, implementation, and monitoring of these
embedded liberal principles. Global civil society brings together like-minded individuals
across national boundaries to engage in the global governance process through advocacy
campaigns and participation in forums and conferences (Boli and Thomas 1999, Ruggie
1983).
To understand the impact of democratization on global civil society fully, we first
review the foundational literature addressing political opportunity structure. This
literature contends that collective action occurs in relation to the opportunities and
constraints imposed by the prevailing political environment. Global civil society does not
develop in a vacuum; instead, it is the creation of specific combinations of historical
context and political environment (McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). When new access
points for engagement emerge, previously marginalized groups work to capitalize on
these opportunities to contest the policy process (Tilly 1978). State structures create
stable opportunities for collective action by increasing access points for policy
discussions, reducing information costs, and routinizing changes in leadership
(McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).
State institutions and actions intentionally, as well as unintentionally, influence
the formation of groups (Skocpol 1983). “Movements may largely be born of
environmental opportunity, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own action”
(McAdams, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 15). Global civil society seeks to develop a
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repertoire of tactics to capitalize on political opportunity, as well as reduce the barriers to
collective action. Olson observes that collective action is rarer and more uneven than the
pluralism theory supposes. Olson offers an alternative to the “orthodox theory of
pressure groups” based on the work of scholars such as Bentley, Truman, and Latham.
According to these scholars,
“Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of
their common interests much as single individuals are expected to act on behalf of
their personal interests” (Olson 1965, 1).
Pluralists believe the collective action occurred spontaneously in response to a policy
change or the actions of a competing pressure group. Olson argues that collective action
is a calculated decision. Members evaluate the costs and benefits of potential outcomes
before acting (Olson 1965). Olson’s research suggests that collective action can be
motivated by either coercion or selectively applied incentives, and not solely the
traditional idea of solidarity or shared interests (Olson 1965).
Ostrom expands on Olson’s work by looking at not only the mechanisms which
promote collective action, but also the institutions that establish the rules of the game.
She concludes that selective incentives can encourage collective action, just as Olson
theorized. However, that is only part of the story; institutions have a more fundamental
influence over how the game is played and not just who joins which team (Ostrom 1990).
Social capital scholars offer a different explanation for collective action. They see
collective action as motivated by a sense of solidarity and the build-up of trust. Social
capital scholars such as Robert Putnam expanded on DeTocqueville’s work, theorizing
that the trust garnered through collective actions transfers to the larger society (Brewer
46 |Hosto-Marti

2003, Putnam 2000). The question at the heart of this argument is the degree to which
thick trust, the trust generated through regular close interaction within close-knit
communities, transfers into thin trust, a weakened sense of solidarity associated with
larger diverse communities (Newton 1997).
In Fukuyama’s, book Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. He
explores the influence of social solidarity and trust on a society’s ability to work toward
the common good. Fukuyama disagrees with Olson’s reliance on incentives, maintaining
that groups organized around narrow economic interest, such as those discussed by
Olson, could inhibit the development of trust. Members of these groups will put their
individual benefits, derived from free riding, ahead of the interests of the group as a
whole. However, when collective action is motivated by a blend of shared economic
interests and social solidarity, it can be the catalyst for promoting prosperity and change
(Fukuyama 1995).
Engaging in voluntary organization is not a universal practice; most of this
collective action occurs among middle and upper class individuals, raising doubt about
the inclusiveness of global civil society (Newton 1997). An additional study discovered
that a direct relationship between social capital and democracy was hard to quantify
because most investigations focus on the individual level. However, if social capital is
aggregated up to the national level, scholars identify a more robust relationship between
generalized trust and political trust as well as a correlation with the level of satisfaction
with democracy (Zmerli and Newton 2008).
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A prerequisite of the present study is to justify the extension of these
predominantly national theories and structures to the international or transnational level.
“[T]he democratic procedure no longer draws its legitimizing force only, indeed
not even predominantly, from political participation and the expression of
political will, but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative process”
(Habermas 2001, 110).

Habermas theorizes that global civil society is a discursive public sphere. It is within this
“marketplace of ideas” where intermediate associations vie to influence policy process.
Some scholars contend that intermediate associations lose meaning when divorced from a
national setting (Bartelson 2006). Bartelson offers an overly restricted interpretation of de
Tocqueville’s observations; interpreting de Tocqueville’s theory outside of a national
context does not change its substance only its scale. Many scholars recognize that in
response to the pervasiveness of international governance, collective action must engage
at the international level, yet the inspiration and support for action may remain rooted in
local and national concerns (Kaldor 2003, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow 2006).
The idea of political opportunities easily translates across boundaries of domestic
political structures. What is the overall political environment available to global civil
society actors? The international political system is a dense network of social and power
relationships creating structural inequalities and injustices that favor insiders over
outsiders. When the target of global civil society has a global focus, it is only reasonable
to investigate that collective action from a global perspective.
The literature alludes to a reciprocal relationship between democracy and global
civil society. In the previous section, the present study discussed the effects of democracy
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on global civil society development. The next section of the literature review will look at
civil society’ ability to promote and sustain democratic transitions. Scholars have
theorized that civil society can educate stakeholders about policy issues and empower
them to express these policy preferences. Researchers have identified numerous specific
tasks performed by global civil society that enables it to foster and enhance democratic
governance on the national, as well as international level.
Nationally, civil society is a vital agent of political socialization, encouraging
citizens to understand better and utilize the tools of citizenship.


Global civil society can promote political rights and facilitate political
participation through active engagement at all levels of the political process
(Omelicheva 2009).



Global civil society multiplies the access points to the global political system by
providing information and resources to political actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998,
Omelicheva 2009, J. Smith 1998).



Global civil society can contribute to social welfare by raising concern and
awareness of economic injustices, socio-economic inequality, and environmental
damage (Omelicheva 2009, J. Smith 1998).



Global civil society can promote peace, tolerance, and democracy by cultivating
and transmitting global cultural norms, thereby transforming public consciousness
(Boli and Thomas 1999, Omelicheva 2009).

Globally civil society is uniquely positioned to enhance and deepen a
cosmopolitan interpretation of democracy. Since global governance lacks the formal
mechanisms of citizenship, such as voting, global civil society organizations provide a
venue for expressing support or disapproval of public policies. However, “if organized
[global] civil society is to serve as a bridge between decisions-makers and the global
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citizenry, it must provide organizational plurality representing diverse and balanced
interests” (Piewitt 2010, 468). To provide this bridge:


Global civil society increases the number of access points to the policy process
through demands for inclusion in international conferences and the creation of
“shadow” conferences when access is denied (Chandhoke 2009, J. Clark 2010,
Clark, Friedman and Hochstelter 1998, Fung and Wright 2001, J. Smith 1998).



Global civil society institutionalizes participation through training and sustain
social movements (Fung and Wright 2001, Baiocchi 2001).



Global civil society facilitates the translation of policy preferences into policy
proposals, which then must vie for legitimacy and support (Fung and Wright
2001).



Global civil society creates an intermediate level of sub-elites, which help
balance power between the people and established elites (Sorensen and Torfing
2005).



Global civil society improves the problem solving and decision making capacity
of governing institutions by increasing bottom-up participation (Sorensen and
Torfing 2005).



Global civil society establishes bridges of communication and understanding
within a diverse network of political actors (Sorensen and Torfing 2005).



Global civil society increases governmental accountability by monitoring
elections, political parties, government officials, and fellow global civil society
organizations (Chandhoke 2009).

Global Civil Society can not guarantee democratic outcomes. Even when civil
society functions according to deTocqueville predictions, associational freedom can
result in less than progressive results. For example, Weimar Germany had a vigorous
associational life, but rather than reducing social cleavages, these organizations increased
fragmentation, weakening fledgling democratic institutions (Berman 1997).
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For this reason, global civil society is insufficient to insure democracy. One possible
deficiency of global civil society organizations, particularly large complex organizations,
is that they can place organizational survival ahead of the best interests of the constituents
they claim to represent. Global civil society has been “promoted as the vehicle by which
democratic and humanitarian values, human rights, ecological sustainability, economic
development, gender and labor divisions, and various other concerns will be addressed
and remedied” (Bowden 2006, 157).
Not all scholars are convinced that the democratizing powers of civil society can
translate from national to the transnational level. Bowden identifies a problem with
internationalizing civil society – a vibrant civil society results from the interaction among
all three spheres, civil society, political and economic. Key features of these spheres are
lacking at the transnational level most glaringly the lack of a transnational equivalent to
the rule of law. Bowden states that, “a global civil society that is free to operate without
regulatory restrictions – as provided by the state at the domestic level – may be prone to
doing more harm than good” (Bowden 2006, 157). Bowden does not encourage the
dismissal of global civil society’s ability to increase participation in global governance
issues; rather he offers a cautionary tale that global civil society should not be exempt
from criticism or oversight.
Armstrong offers a more optimistic assessment of global civil society’s ability to
enhance democratic rule. “… Civil society at the global level is ethically superior to its
seedbeds, at the national level, for global civil society overcomes the exclusionary
tendencies of Westphalian citizenship” (Armstrong 2006, 351). Global civil society has
yet to realize its full potential to cultivate global democratic egalitarianism. It still faces
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barriers in the spread of universal human rights and universal human responsibility across
the globe. Furthermore, global civil society has not been able to transcend traditional
power relationships between countries and multinational corporations (Armstrong 2006).
Case study research confirms that global civil society is a necessary, yet
insufficient contributing factor in the democratization process. The success or failure of
global civil society to live up to the theories has met with varying results. Global civil
society has increased accountability and transparency, promoted civility in public
discourse, educated the electorate, and supported the rule of law, but is insufficient to
bring about democratic governance on its own (Carroll and Carroll 2004). Frequently
global civil society fills the role of critic, calling attention to the deficiencies in
international negotiations, international laws, and transnational economic activities. It
still lacks the capacity to implement alternative public policy without the cooperation of
nation-states (Falk 1995).
A nascent civil society frequently exists before democratization begins. The
factors that influence the evolution of civil society are political, social, and economic.
Several political factors shaping the outcome of civil society include the degree to which
the state is supportive, repressive, or ambivalent toward civic groups, basic legal and
political rights are afforded to citizens, and the rule of law has developed (Nord 2000).
Social factors influencing the development of civil society include the effect of
the religious community and the autonomy of universities. Religion plays a significant
role in the evolution of civil society. Religious organizations can be a catalyst for social
engagement. However, religious cleavages can also diminish the actualization of a robust
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civil society by emphasizing in-group solidarity. Autonomous universities provide the
perfect venue for the civic engagement by educating citizens in critical thinking and
promoting spirited discourse (Nord 2000).
Economic factors also influence the development of modern civil society;
urbanization tends to contribute to the development of the civil society. As the
community differentiates along economic lines, the political and social concerns of
farmers and workers diverge. Economic booms tend to promote growth of civil society as
people, freed from survival considerations, engage in other aspects of civil and political
life (Nord 2000).
Pivotal factors such as war and revolution can change the relationship of people to
their governments, with mixed results for civil society. They can open the door for
increased civil society activity or provide the incentive for governments to repress social
activism (Nord 2000).
Scholars have observed the effect of these factors on global civil society’s ability
to promote and sustain democratic transitions in Africa, Asia, Central Europe, and South
America. To varying degrees, these scholars find that while civil society promotes
participation, entrenched political institutions and existing power relationships can limit
its overall impact (McNulty 2012).
In a comparative study of Southeast Asian countries, Loh observed that global
civil society promotes political participation. His study further concluded that increased
political participation has long lasting effects on the overall political environment. The
global civil society movements in Southeast Asia brought about changes in government
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infrastructure ranging from an increased recognition of civil and political rights to the
creation of formal institutions such as constitutions and the rule of law.
However, a change in infrastructure does not necessarily result in a change in
existing power relationship. Entrenched leaders can remain in place, leaving new
institutions vulnerable to cooptation or corruption (Loh 2008, 135). Loh (2008) found
that alterations in citizen’s expectations of involvement in government showed the most
durability. He observed that even when formal political channels are blocked, civil
society groups remain active in the “extra-electoral realm of everyday politics. “ NGOs
can create an alternative political dialogue by linking diverse groups: political parties,
unions, religious organizations, and ethnic groups in a collective public space” (Loh
2008, 136).
Another study from Southeast Asia found similarly positive results. “Civil society
activism contributes substantially to increasing transparency, building the legal
infrastructure for democracy, and providing voice and advocacy in support of reform”
(Antlov, Brinkerhoff and Rapp 2010, 435). However, both societal and organizational
factors moderate civil society’s capacity for change. On the societal level the political
environment, social norms and values, socio-economic conditions, and the legal and
regulatory framework affect the ability of social movements to produce substantive
change. Organizationally, a lack of leadership, resources, network linkages, and
organizational capacity can limit the ability of global civil society organizations to boost
democratic transitions (Antlov, Brinkerhoff and Rapp 2010).
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Studies of South Korea’s democratic transition found a similarly positive
relationship between a robust civil society and democratization. These studies focus on
global civil society’s role as a carrier of civic culture. According to Kim (2000), civil
society provides citizens with access to political training, information, opportunities,
linkages to other organizations, and resources thereby enabling them, to consolidate
democratic transition.
Koo (2002) elaborated on Kim’s research by identifying key historical factors,
which contributed to the Korean people’s readiness to embrace civil society. The 1987
democratic transition finally provided the Korean people with the resources and the
opportunity to restructure state power according to their national ideals and values. A
history of colonization and occupation resulted in a tradition of strong central
government, but it also brought about a strong and highly politicized society. Because
outside forces wielded state power for most of Korea’s history, a clear separation
between state and society formed. The Korean people also developed a strong sense of
national identity, providing a foundation for civil society. Koo further credits the ability
of Korean civil society to consolidate the 1987 democratic transition to the support
received from global civil society. Korean civil society drew organizational and
ideological support from its links to global civil society organizations (Koo 2002).
Still other scholars have observed less encouraging results for global civil
society’s democratization efforts. Success is not guaranteed, and much depends on the
democratic nature of the organizations that make up global civil society (Omelicheva
2009). Ndegwa (1996) observed in a case study of Kenyan civil society that while civil
society has the potential to advance democratization, nothing insures that global civil
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society organizations operate according to democratic traditions, most significantly the
willingness of global civil society leadership to pursue a democratizing agenda. He
observed that some organizations find it easier to accomplish their mission by
cooperating with the national government, even when the government is repressive
(Ndegwa 1996).
DeZeeuw (2005) also offered limited view of global civil society’s ability to
promote a democratic transition. He found that post conflict states face a particularly
difficult transition. While donor funded training offered by global civil society
organizations seems to embolden the initial transition, their effects diminish rapidly and
become largely insignificant in the overall democratization process. Democracy
assistance can create organizations capable of facilitating governmental reform, but
organizations alone are not enough to assure a stable democratic institution.
The effectiveness of civil society to support a democratic transition, therefore,
depends on the political and social environment in which it operates. Civil society can
serve as a training ground for increased participation, but it can also perpetuate existing
economic and social cleavages, thereby preserving the political status quo (Armony 2004,
Foley and Edwards 1996). A strength of civil society organizations is their tendency to
function outside the traditional corridors of power. Outsider status allows civil society to
utilize a varied repertoire of political engagement, but it can also allow exclusion from
the formal policy process (Langohr 2004).
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GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: HYPOTHESES
To reiterate, the relationship between global civil society and democracy is a
symbiotic one. Global civil society cannot reach its full potential without a minimal level
of political autonomy and political freedoms, best realized in a democracy. Nor can a
democracy survive without the active participation of its stakeholders and citizens in the
policy process, facilitated by global civil society. The first hypothesis proposes that
global civil society needs a modicum of democracy characterized by associational
freedom, as well as a basic respect for the rule of law to flourish. The current study
expects to find that democratic nations are more active in global civil society,
demonstrated by the larger numbers of INGOs within those countries. Democratic nations
have more open political opportunity structures, enabling people to exercise their
associational rights fully. Authoritarian governments repress civic engagement, thus
reducing the associational space in which INGO’s operate. As countries open up the
political system, civil society has room to flourish.
The current study employs a second model to test for reciprocity in relationship
between democracy and global civil society, using the democracy measure as the
dependent variable and number of INGOs an independent variable, while keeping all
other variables constant. This model tests the hypothesis that countries with large
numbers of INGOs will have higher democracy scores on the Polity IV index. Political
participation, regularly facilitated by global civil society, is essential for democratic
governance. Both global and domestic civil society improves the stability and longevity
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of democracy by increasing participation in political life, promoting civic education,
aggregating policy preferences, and reducing information and opportunity costs.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCITY AND DEMOCRACY: VARIABLES
As discussed earlier, democracy is a complex phenomenon, this study uses the
Polity 2 score from the Polity IV index to measure the variation in governing structures
for the countries observed. The Polity IV project codes the governing characteristics of
nations for the purpose of comparative quantitative analysis. The Polity project has
proven its value to researchers over the years, becoming the most widely used resource
for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority.
The Polity IV Index measures institutionalized democracy based on three
essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures
through which citizens can effectively express preferences about alternative policies and
leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power
by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives
and acts of political participation. The polity project defines autocracy as a lack of
regularized political competition and political freedoms. Subtracting the autocracy score
from the democracy score produces a country’s polity score ranging from +10 (strongly
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2013).
Box plots illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the explanatory variables, as
well as demonstrations the influence of outlying values. The horizontal line at the center
of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the relative extreme values. The
individual points identify outlying values.
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Descriptive statistics cannot identify the precise direction of causality between
democracy and size of global civil society, but they illuminate statistical and substantive
differences between democracies and autocracies. Democracies have a wider range for
the numbers of INGOs covering (70-4036) compared to a range of (24-1334) for
autocracies. In addition, democracies average 1174 INGOs, nearly three times as many
INGOs as autocracies (392).
FIGURE 5
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Source: Union of International Associations and Center for Systemic Peace
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GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: RESULTS

Democratization: As a country becomes more open the number of INGOs
operating in that country will increase
H1 - As a country moves from a classification of autocracy to democracy on the Polity
IV Index the number of INGOs operating in the country will increase
H2 – As a country increases its participation in global civil society, as measured by the
number of INGOs operating in that country, the country’s Polity 2 score will move
closely to the full democracy score.

The democratic expansion explanation for the growth in global civil society is
predicated on the idea that government institutions and policies either encourage or
impede associational freedom. Democratic forms of government provide citizens with
the means and the reasons to participate in political life. Democratic governments
promote freedom of speech and assembly, which make it possible for civil society groups
to organize. In addition, democratic governments encourage a myriad of policy
proposals, providing citizens with a range of policies to support or oppose.
Authoritarian forms of government profoundly restrict citizens’ ability and
incentive to participate in political life. Authoritarian regimes either prohibit freedom of
speech and association outright or place overwhelming restrictions on the exercise of
these rights, effectively preventing their exercise. At the same time, authoritarian regimes
severely restrict policy options, rendering political participation moot.
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FIGURE 6

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

The current study found that democratic change is both statistically and
practically significant in both the INC model and the LIC model. In both models, when a
government moves one unit from a strongly authoritarian (-10) to strongly democratic
(+10) Polity 2 score the number of INGOs in that country increases by nearly 2%. This
finding may seem like a minor change, but when examined in relation to the complex and
multifaceted changes that must occur to produce any change in the Polity index, even a
small statistical shift is indicative of a larger substantive change in the openness of the
political environment. This result is also practically significant, since even a 1 unit
change on the Polity 2’s 20 point scale is the result of significant and cumulative change
in election processes, rule of law, and civic rights. The majority of countries in the
current study changed less than 2 units on the Polity 2 scale over the 28 years of this
study.
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FIGURE 7

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

The democratic expansion explanation does not achieve statistical significance in
the HIC model. The lack of statistical significance can be attributed to the nature of the
analysis and not failure of the theory. The 1402 country-years in this model show very
little variance in the Polity 2 scores. Most of the countries maintain a fully democratic
score of 9 or 10 throughout the period covered by the study. Thus, there is little for the
Polity 2 score to explain in these countries.
DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS
The literature on democratic development indicates that the relationship between
democracy and global civil society is a reciprocal one; as a result, it is hard to determine
the direction of causality for this relationship. The present study runs a supplemental
model to identify the direction of causality between the number of INGOs and a
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country’s Polity 2 score. These results indicate a .02% increase in the Polity 2 score for
every 1% increase in the number of INGOs. Again we find a small change, yet
considering the complexity of democratic change even this small change should be
considered a substantive contribution.
We also see that treaties signed, GDP per capita, and social development index
are also statistically significant predictor of democracy. A one percent change in the
number of treaties signed increases the Polity 2 score by .01%. A one percent change in
GDP per capita increases the Polity 2 score by .002%; whereas, a one unit increase in the
social development index will increase the Polity 2 score by .90 scale units. These results
support the reciprocal relationship between civil society and democracy since treaties
signed, and GDP are also statistically significant for global civil society growth.
One variable raises questions. The number of IGOs is statistically significant, but
with a negative impact on the Polity 2 score. For every additional IGO the Polity 2 score
decreases by .12 scale units. This finding is counter intuitive based on the positive
relationship observed between other variables of political integration (treaties signed and
INGOs) and democracy. A possible explanation for this result could be that fragile states
may receive more interventions from the global community in the form of IGO outreach.
Additional research is needed to identify other possible explanations.
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FIGURE 8

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

SUMMARY
In summary, democracy clearly plays a necessary role in the growth of global
civil society, but it alone is not sufficient to explain the exponential growth over recent
years. Both the statistical as well as the anecdotal evidence support a strong mutually
reinforcing relationship between democracy and civil society, particularly at the national
level.
Taking these findings to the global level is trickier, primarily because there seems
to be a lack of traditional democratic mechanisms, such as elections or representative
government. However, the results from the reciprocal models provide some compelling
evidence that global civil society can have similar effects on global governance,
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especially when we see that other variables for political inclusion are also statistically
significant for promoting democracy.
The results identify a clear and mutually reinforcing relationship between
democracy and growth of global civil society. This democratic connection lends further
support to those voices calling for an enhanced role for global civil society actors in the
international policy process. UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon was on the right track
by suggesting that international policy problems can best be solved by an inclusive
network of global actors, of which INGOs are a vital part.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Global Civil Society and Political Integration
What do Princess Diana, Cambodian farmers, and hundreds of school children
have in common? They were all part of the thousands of ordinary citizens who mobilized
to create a mine free world. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was
created to ensure the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty. Its member organizations were
able to use their firsthand knowledge of the indiscriminate damage wreaked on civilians
by abandoned landmines and cluster bombs to raise the international profile of this issue.
Song Kosai, a landmine survivor and ICBL ambassador summed up the devastation
produced by these indiscriminate weapons. "Sometimes as a child I dreamed that I had
two legs again and I ran freely in the rice fields, feeling the grass under my toes. I really
wish that soon children can play without danger, with no more mines in our fields"
(International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2013).
As a non-state actor, the campaign was uniquely positioned to shift the issue of
landmine reduction from a military matter to a humanitarian concern. This ground swell
of public support overcame the superpowers’ insistence that landmines were a matter of
national security to be resolved between sovereign countries. ICBL provided ‘moral’
cover allowing states that were already sympathetic to the issue to ‘fast-track’ the treaty,
limiting the ability of countries such as the United States and Russia to water down the
agreement (English 1998).
The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in ten months, a historical record; 40
states signed the treaty in December of 1997, achieving the necessary number for
ratification by October of 1998. The treaty entered into force in March 1999. As of 2009,
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156 states have signed the treaty, 39 states remain outside of the agreement, including the
United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan (Short 1999). ICBL was awarded the
Nobel peace prize in 1997 for their efforts.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: LITERATURE
REVIEW
The political integration approach to global civil society is a recent development.
In the 1960, international governmental institutions began taking a hands-on approach to
national development. Led by the United Nations, the subsequent “development decades”
have created a demand for international public administrators, which INGOs answered.
Global civil society organizations are active at every level of the policy process from
formulation to implementation (Coate 2009, Kotschnig 1968).
The political integration approach views civil society as a remedy for the
governmental failures. Governments often struggle to provide and maintain public goods
and common spaces (Ostrom 1990). This approach theorizes that civil society is better
able to administer public good and services because it is closer to the recipients of these
services. Global civil society provides a venue for the expression of public goods
preferences when normal citizenship channels are not available, especially at the global
level.
The New Policy Agenda approach to global governance casts civil society as a
network of associations, organizations, and movements, which interact with government
as both partner and critic, seeking to ensure a more equitable and responsive public
policy (Cohen and Arato 1992, Keane 1998, Fowler 1998, Keck and Sikkink 1998,
67 |Hosto-Marti

Fowler 2011, Edwards and Hulme 2013). The participation of non-state actors in global
governance does not necessarily signal a transfer of power away from the state to nonstate actors, but rather a change in the logic of government. Global civil society is no
longer just a tool of government, but an independent sphere of “self-associations”
exercising political influence over how decisions are made (Sending and Neumann 2006).
Global civil society has several attributes that enable it to excel at the provision of
public goods and services. These include close ties to the community, a tendency toward
policy innovation, specialized expertise, and a commitment to long-term monitoring and
accountability. First, global civil society has closer ties to the recipients of public goods
and services than governments, and especially IGOs, international governmental
organization. Global civil society organizations, which are created by members of the
community or at least encourage participation from community members, are in a better
position to respond to the community’s needs and concerns (Fowler 1998).
Second, these organizations are less bureaucratic than government institutions,
enabling them to innovate and alter programs in response to the needs of beneficiaries.
These nimble organizations are better positioned to make midcourse program corrections,
based on participation feedback, than more cumbersome bureaucracies. Since these
organizations operate on a smaller scale than national governments or IGOs, they have
the flexibility to customize programs (Broome 2009).
Thirdly, like bureaucracies, global civil society actors possess expertise and skill.
Enabling global civil society to preserve the bureaucratic assets of know-how and
efficiency, while correcting for bureaucratic deficits such as isolation and detachment
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(Brautigam and Segrra 2007). Therefore, these organizations tend to focus on specific
causes or missions. As a result they become knowledgeable about this specific issue area,
providing them with expertise that might be lacking from a more generalized governing
institution. Mastery of specialized knowledge have enabled global civil society
organizations have become vital partners in policy networks and epistemic communities
(Cooper and Hocking 2000).
Fourth, global civil society organizations are willing to commit time and
resources to long term monitoring of policy issues. As a watchdog organization, global
civil society draws on all the previous stated attributes. Global civil society organizations
leverage mission, community ties, autonomy, and resources to gather information and
hold governing institutions accountable for policy outcomes (Smith and Korzeniewics
2007).
For the purposes of this study, once again the feasibility of analyzing the political
integration approach to civil society at the global level needs to be established. This
interpretation of civil society easily translates to the global arena. Since citizenship has
never been a pre-requisite for being a stakeholder, this approach makes a smooth
transition from national to global policy. Anywhere public policies are implemented this
theory can be explored.
“Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on
the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common condition gives rise to diverse
outcomes. … At times the absence of centralized international authority precludes
attainment of common goals… Yet, at other times, states do realize common
goals through cooperation under anarchy” (Oye [1986] 2009).
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The 1930-40s represented a time when nations realized a profound need for
cooperation. Isolationism and “beggar thy neighbor” policies resulted in a demoralizing
global economic depression and a cataclysmic world war. Nations created institutions
with the international authority to establish protocols, promote cooperation, and sanction
transgressions to prevent future devastation. These institutions include the United Nations
System, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These new international governmental institutions provided a
recognized structure to govern international peace and security as well as economic
relations, thereby providing nation states with the stability necessary to pursue
appropriate policies of economic recovery or industrialization (Oatly 2008, Stiglitz 2002).
Soon after the creation of this new system, scholars began analyzing how “global
governance” functioned. Theoretically sovereign states invested these institutions with
credibility derived from their individual authority (Keohane 1998). However, this pooled
sovereignty did not result in a complete transfer of legitimacy. Scholars observed a
disconnection or “democratic deficit” between the technocratic management of these
institutions and the nations/people impacted by their policies. Democratic deficit became
short hand for the lack of transparency and accountability associated with IGOS (Marjone
1998).
These same scholars have looked to civil society to mitigate the democratic
deficiencies in international institutions. Global civil society can increase transparency by
collecting, analyzing, and distributing information about the inner workings of global
governance. In addition, global civil society uses advocacy and public information
campaigns to attract the attention of global policy makers to the plight of marginalized
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people (O'Brien, Goetz and Scholte 2000). Global civil society has not only exerted its
influence in the areas of human rights, development, and the environment, but also in the
traditionally state-centric areas of security (Cooper and Hocking 2000, Davenport 2003).
Distrust of policy makers and administrators associated with “big government”
has prompted the devolution of responsibility and authority toward non-state actors from
the private and civil society sector (Fukuyama 2004, Cooper and Hocking 2000). The
core objective of privatization is to reinvent government; making it more efficient for
taxpayers and hopefully more responsive to constituents (Jones and Thompson 1997,
Peters 1994, Mishra 2012).
Privatization is not without its critics. Critics point out that there are fundamental
differences between the public and private sectors. The foundation of this difference,
according to Moe ([1987] 2007), rests on the concept of sovereignty. As a sovereign the
state has responsibilities and obligations that are completely absent from the private
sector. For example, a sovereign has sole right to the legitimate use of force or coercion.
By extension, it has an obligation to protect its constituents from illegitimate use of force
or coercion. The issue of sovereignty dictates that privatization within the public sector
comes with inherent sacrifices. A government cannot enter into an agreement with a nonstate actor without running the risk of sacrificing some measure of its control, power, and
legitimacy.
During periods of crisis or governmental collapse, global civil society
organizations have replaced the state machinery (Jareg and Kaseje 1998). When states
transfer too much authority to non-state actors, they run the risk of becoming irrelevant,

71 |Hosto-Marti

what Milward and Provan (2000) referred to as the “hollow state”. Poorly managed
public/private partnerships lead to unacceptable results, confused accountability, and
ultimately a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. When public/private partnerships
work effectively, they can enhance a state’s flexibility, responsiveness, and efficiency
(Milward and Provan 2000, Fredericksen and London 2000, Batley and McLoughlin
2010, Fredericksen and Levin 2004, Cerny 1995).
Much of global civil society’s credibility, according to public administration
theories, rests with its autonomy from both governmental and market forces.
Autonomous global civil society actors should be motivated by the interests of their
members instead of votes or profits (Sending and Neumann 2006). When global civil
society organizations partner with IGOs a close relationship develops. Some say too
close. Sometimes this closeness leads to global civil society organizations mimicking the
practices of funders (Smith and Fetner 2007). Professionals even alternate working in
both sectors. While this type of exchange can increase communication, it can also stifle
innovation and constituents’ participation (Brautigam and Segrra 2007, Jareg and Kaseje
1998).
Another area of concern over the too-close relationship between global civil
society and institutional or governmental funders is cooptation. Can global civil society
organizations speak truth to power if they are financially dependent on government grants
and contracts? It is the classic dilemma of serving two masters. How can an organization
effectively represent marginalized populations when the national government or large
foundations are paying the bills (Howell and Lind 2009, Sending and Neumann 2006,
Hoksbergen 2005, Mallaby 2004)?
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Competition for government or donor support, as well as fiscal uncertainty, can
subvert the efforts of global civil society organizations, perpetuating ineffective
programs, enabling corruption, and exacerbating competition. These factors leave global
civil society organizations vulnerable to cooptation by authoritarian regimes. Competition
does not always lead to increased efficiency. When global civil society organizations
compete for contracts, they tend to mirror the structures of their funding agents; reducing
their comparative advantages and undermining their credibility with constituents (Cooley
and Ron 2002).
How do these public/private partnerships manifest themselves in relation to
IGOS? Increasingly, IGOs have turned to global civil society organizations to deliver
services, consult on the formation of policies and programs, and monitor the effectiveness
of international programs and agreements. In 2011, global civil society organizations
administered $19.3 billion or 14% of official development assistance compared to $17.3
billion on average over the period 2008-201 (OECD 2013). This public/private
partnership is essential to the programs of the development aid regime (Fowler 2011).
Questions arise about the effectiveness of global civil society organizations in
managing successful development campaigns. Many of the same attributes, which
recommend them as partners in development could also limit their effectiveness. Most
glaringly, an organization’s mission can present ethical dilemmas. Administering ODA
can divert attention away from core missions such as human rights or the environment.
Often a loss of mission focus leads to miscommunications with funders and host
governments resulting in ineffective or unresponsive programs. Clients of these programs
can end up worse off than when the program began (Winkler 2008).
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International governmental organizations support public/private partnerships by
providing funding, training, and access to decisions makers. However, the structure of
partnerships varies significantly depending on the organization. Some IGOs encourage
close cooperation with global civil society organizations. Others experience distant,
sometimes contentious relationship with global civil society organizations. This next
section will briefly discuss the civil society engagement programs of the United Nations,
World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
Consultation with non-state actors is codified in the United Nations’ charter.
Chapter X, Article 71 states,
“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangement for consultation with
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.
Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and where appropriate,
with national organizations after consultation with the Members of the United Nations
concerned” (United Nations 1945).
This relationship with global civil society has grown closer in recent years. The
United Nations not only directs funding through global civil society’s to provide services,
but also directly supports global civil society organizations to enhance capacity and
improvement (Reimann 2006). Currently more than 30,000 global civil society
organizations have established formal relationships with the United Nations or one of its
specialized agencies (United Nations 2015).
The World Bank began to interact with civil society in the 1970s by collaborating
with global civil society organizations to address environmental concerns over funded
programs. The World Bank learned that including global civil society organization in
development projects enhances the projects performance by contributing local
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knowledge, providing technical expertise, and leveraging social capital (Brewer 2003).
For several decades this relationship remained limited to environmental issues.
World Bank’s interaction with global civil society gained additional momentum
on its 50th anniversary. Global civil society launched the intensive “50 Years is enough”
campaign in 1996. In an attempt to neutralize the negative public perception generated by
these protests, the World Bank launched implemented a more comprehensive program for
global civil society engagement (Engler 2003, J. Smith 2002, Khagram, Riker and
Sikkink 2002).
The World Bank has been relatively successful in engaging global civil society. In
2001, less than 100 global civil society organizations participated in the World Bank’s
annual meeting, by 2011 that number had grown to more than 600 organizations
representing 85 countries. In 1990, a little over twenty percent of World Bank projects
involved consultation with global civil society. By 2012, more than eighty percent of
projects included global civil society representatives (World Bank 2013).
The WTO has struggled with how to engage global civil society effectively. The
Marrakesh Agreement of 1994, which established the WTO, acknowledged a need for
“consulting and cooperation” with nongovernmental organizations (Scholte 1998). The
WTO’s membership structure of the makes difficult to include global civil society
organizations in the formal deliberations. Only members are allowed to participate in
negotiations or seek redress of trade infractions through the dispute settlement process. In
an attempt to established more formal means of communication with global civil society.
The WTO has established regular civil society briefings by the Director General and a
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mechanism of global civil society organizations to submit friend of the court briefs in the
dispute settlement process (Esteve 2011).
Since 1998, civil society organizations have submitted over 500 position papers to
the dispute settlement process. In recent years participation in this program has decreased
dramatically, over ninety percent of the position papers were submitted before 2005
(World Trade Organization 2014).
FIGURE 9
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Determining the precise cause of this drop-off in global civil society participation would
require a separate study. However, two factors have likely contributed to the decline.
First, negotiations in the Doha trade negotiation round languished for more than ten years
prompting some to question the relevance of the WTO. Secondly, the dispute settlement
process rules keep all but the litigants of each case at arm’s length leading to frustration
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and discouraging participation. These two factors could have led global civil society to
focus their engagement with the WTO on more productive activities.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has the least formal program for civil
society engagement. The IMF consults with civil society on an as needed based. Global
civil society organizations are encouraged to participate in parallel conferences, which
take place at the same time as the World Bank’s annual meetings (International Monetary
Fund 2014).
Whether the relationship is cooperative or antagonistic, global civil society
regularly interact with IGOs. This study tests the nature of this relationship by looking
for a correlation between the number of IGOs operating in a country and the number of
INGOs active in that same country. Where applicable, this study also looks at the impact
of funding opportunities in the form of official development aid.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: HYPOTHESES
The next theory examined in this study maintains that global civil society
expansion can be attributed to the increase in international political integration. The end
of World War II, ushered in an era of unprecedented cooperation. The Great Depression
and World War II provided graphic illustrations of the failure of isolationists’ policies
and the dangers of secretive alliances. A new paradigm of international relations was
needed to help the world recover. New institutions of global governance were created,
resulting in a proliferation of international treaties and agreements.
This study examines the relationship between a thriving global civil society and
international political integration, hypothesizing that nations that actively engage in the
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international political system will have a larger global civil society presence. Three
variables are used to measure political integration: the number of international treaties a
country has signed; the number of IGOs in that country, and net ODA per capita in all but
the HIC model, where the majority of countries do not receive development aid.
The literature predicts that increased political integration, particularly in the form
of increased treaty commitments, will increase the need for countries to partner with
global civil society to help meet the administrative demands of implementation and
compliance (Fowler 1998, Edwards 2011, Tvedt, 2002). As the number of treaties signed
by a country increases so will the number of INGOs operating in that country.
IGOs also increase political integration. They instrumental in negotiating,
implementing, and monitoring international treaties and agreements. In addition, they
often provide funding for and encourage participating nations to enter into public/private
partnerships with INGOs to facilitate the administration and monitoring of the progress of
these programs. This study hypothesizes that the as the number of IGOs operating in a
country increases so will the number of INGOs operating in that same country.
Lastly, measuring net ODA per capita, focuses the impact of public/private
partnerships on a specific global governance regime – foreign aid. The literature supports
using the development aid regime to illustrate the new policy agenda in action. Aid
granting organizations, such as the World Bank, IMF, USAID, and the OECD often
contract with INGOs to deliver the assistance. These partnerships are intended to achieve
two key objectives. The first is to provide donors with a clear and direct line of
accountability, something that might be lacking when working with host country
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governments (Batley and McLoughlin 2010). The second is to provide a mechanism for
beneficiaries to influence the structure of programs. INGOs often incorporate direct
participation from clients in the development and implementation of programs, thereby
creating more responsive and effective interventions (Clapp 2005, Edwards and Hulme
2013, Fowler 1998). Based on this literature, this study hypothesizes that as the amount
of ODA received by a country increases, the number of INGOs operating in that country
will also increase.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: VARIABLES
The following box plots illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the
explanatory variables, as well as demonstrations the influence of outlying values. The
horizontal line at the center of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the
relative extreme values. The individual points identify outlying values.
FIGURE 10

Sources: Union of International Associations and the United Nations' Treaty Database

79 |Hosto-Marti

This study utilizes data from the United Nations treaty database to obtain the
number of treaties signed by a country. This online database provides information on the
status of over 550 major multilateral treaties and agreements recorded with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. These treaties and agreements cover a range of subject
matter including human rights, disarmament, commodities, refugees, environment, and
the Law of the Sea. The number of treaties deposited with the Secretary-General
continues to grow. This database tracks the status of each agreement, regarding if
member states have signed, ratified, acceded, or lodged reservations/objections (United
Nations 2013).
Treaty adoption comes with administrative and compliance obligations. If a
country is unable to meet these obligations, INGOs with an interest in the success of the
treaty will offer assistance. The case study of negotiations, ratification, and monitoring of
the Mine Ban Treaty illustrates the potential of INGO/Member State partnerships
(Davenport 2003).
High treaty adopting countries are those countries that have signed more than the
median number of treaties (115). Figure 10 shows that high adopting countries have a
higher average number of INGOs 1197 compared to lower adopters, which average 281
INGOS per country year. There is also greater variance in the number of INGOs among
high adopters, with the number of INGOs ranging from 119-4025, whereas low adopters
tend to cluster tightly at the lower end of the range with the number of INGOs ranging
from 5-1290.
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This study further measures political integration by the number of IGOs working
in a country, IGOs are organizations composed of sovereign states, or of other
intergovernmental organizations established by treaty, charter, or other agreement.
Examples include the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, and OECD
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Union of International
Associations 2012). These organizations frequently collaborate with global civil society
to deliver services and monitor program success. The data used to measure the number
of IGOs is collected by the UIA (Union of International Associations 2012).
FIGURE 11

Source: Union of International Associations

Once again, we see a significant difference between highly politically integrated
countries, those with 43 or more IGOs active in any country year and less integrated
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countries. Highly integrated countries host three times as many INGOs (1195) as less
integrated countries (310). Once again, we see that variance is greater among highly
politically integrated countries while less politically integrated countries cluster near the
lower end.
Lastly, this study looks at the impact of participation by recipient countries in the
international development aid regime on global civil society. The literature predicts a
strong positive relationship between receiving development aid and a strong global civil
society presence. However, in a bivariate analysis we see no difference in mean between
countries that receive high amounts of ODA, more than $92 per person, and those
countries that receive lower amounts of economic assistance.
FIGURE 12
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The box plot does illustrate some interesting characteristics of these data. The first
is that nearly four times as many countries are categorized as low ODA. In addition a
significant number of observations are outliers falling outside the measure of central
tendency in both categories.
One possible explanation for the lack of difference in means is categorization.
The literature does not offer a definition of high or low aid recipients. Without direction
from the literature, the current study chooses to classify these countries based on the
mean to reduce selection bias. The regression analysis identified a more detailed
relationship between ODA and global civil society.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: RESULTS
Political Integration Explanation: As a country integrates into international
policy regimes, particularly the ODA regime, the number of INGOs operating in
that country will increase
H2a - As the number of multilateral treaties to which a country is a signatory increases,
the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H2b - As the number of IGOs with an office in a country increases, the number of
INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H2c - As ODA, measured as a percentage of the GDP, increases, the number of INGOs
operating in recipient countries will increase.

The regression analysis finds evidence to support a strong, positive relationship
between political integration and global civil society. All three variables testing these
hypotheses are significant in two of the three models. ODA is not included in the HIC
model because only a fraction of the observations in this dataset have data for this
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variable. Inclusion of this variable generates too many errors to run the panel regression
effectively.
In the inclusive model all three factors: treaties signed, number of IGOs, and
ODA, measuring international political integration are statistically significant. For every
100% increase in the number of treaties signed by a country the number of INGOS
increases by 35%. For each additional IGO operating in a country the number of INGOS
increases by 3%. For every 100% increase in the Net ODA per capita the number of
INGOS increases by 21%. The ODA result is particularly interesting since higher income
countries included in the INC model do not receive ODA. In fact, 30% of the observed
country-years do not have data for this variable.
FIGURE 13

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database
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Treaty adoption and IGO presence remains statistically significant in the HIC
model. In fact treaty adoption has a greater impact on high income countries. A 100%
increase in the number of treaties signed increases the number of INGOs active in high
income countries by 60%. IGO presence has less of a substantive effect; adding each
additional IGO increases the number of INGOs by slightly less than 3%.
FIGURE 14

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

The LIC model generates findings consistent with the inclusive model for treaties
signed and IGO variables, but the ODA measure has a greater substantive impact on
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global civil society growth in low income countries. This effect is not surprising
considering the availability of the data. For every 100% increase in the number of treaties
signed by a country the number of INGOS increases by 32%. For each additional IGO
operating in a country, the number of INGOS increases by 3%. For every additional
100% increase in the Net ODA per capita the number of INGOS increases by 33% in low
income countries.
FIGURE 15

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

The literature suggests that this growth has less to do with the actual treaties or
the presence of IGOs, but more to do with the programs and funding these interactions
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bring with them. Global civil society, in its roles as service providers and policy
watchdog, is essential to the implementation and monitoring of international agreements.
Countries turn to global civil society organizations to fill administrative gaps.
International government organizations contract directly with global civil society
organizations to deliver these programs.
Global civil society organizations are essential to service delivery in the
international aid regime. In 2011, global civil society organizations administered $19.3
billion or 14% of official development assistance. (OECD 2013) This involvement has
been steadily increasing since the late 1980s.
SUMMARY
In summary, the analysis presented above supports a strong relationship between
global governance and global civil society. These results are remarkably similar across
the models. A positive interpretation of these results suggests that political integration
provides the opportunity for global civil society actors to make global governance more
responsive by increasing public awareness of policies and encouraging participation,
especially from marginalized populations.
A pessimistic interpretation of the results could be summarizes as an “if you fund
it they will come” interpretation of global civil society’s growth. This interpretation
raising questions about how much of this growth can be ascribed to a bottom-up
associational revolution and how much of its expansion is attributable to a top-down
mandate from funders. This interpretation of global civil society growth raises questions
about whose interest these organizations serve, the recipients of these programs or the
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funders. While both groups are motivated by a common desire to address an issue, they
often have different approaches and agendas.
Political integration has greater substantive significance in high income countries.
When the number of treaties signed increased by 100%, the number of INGOs increased
by 60%, compared to 35% in the inclusive model. However, the results for IGO
influence remain consistent. For every additional IGO the number of INGOs increased by
3%, the same as the inclusive model. These results indicate that outsourcing
administrative duties to INGOS is not solely a developing world phenomenon even
though ODA is matters most for lower income countries.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Global Civil Society and Economic Integration
Protestors, trade ministers, and sea turtles, oh my! A massive anti-globalization
demonstration, dubbed the “Battle in Seattle” shocked the world and put the WTO and
other economic IGOs on notice that “our world was not for sale”. Their theatrical and
combative tactics, widely photographed protestors dressed as sea turtles, garnered
publicity across the globe. This amorphous, often politically deadly, collective mobilizes
public pressure, to achieve key objectives. In 1999, their objectives were to challenge the
secretive and back room negotiation practices of the WTO, demanding to be heard (J.
Smith 2002).
These activists did not feel adequately represented by their government official.
They were further angered by the covert inclusion of business interests in the drafting of
international trade rules. Fresh off their success defeating the Multilateral Agreement of,
these largely labor and environmental groups set out to proclaim that they would no
longer be ignored (Reitan 2007).
The Seattle ministerial marked a newly antagonistic era in trade negotiations,
characterized by the laborious 14-year long Doha Development Round (Bhagwati 2001).
A counter movement comprised of global civil society organization and developing
countries refused to have the pathways for development dictated to them by the
Washington Consensus.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMICS: LITERATURE REVIEW
The economics approach includes two distinct camps of scholars. Neoliberal
scholars analyze civil society through the lens of supply and demand. Alternative
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development scholars analyze civil society through the lens of economic selfdetermination. Both of these groups identify the origins of civil society as the result of
splitting political life from both commerce and labor (Boyd 2013).
Neoliberal economic scholars connect the concept of civil society to the work of
Adam Smith. However, for Adam Smith civil society was rather different from the
modern use of the term. It referred to a specific historical moment when man moved from
savagery to community. In his classic work The Wealth of Nations, Smith comments
more on the principle of civility. Commerce polishes away the rough edges of human
nature and leads to cultivation of civility and manners. By increasing familiarity with
those outside the core group, economic exchange reduces parochialism and cultivates a
shared sense of humanity (A. Smith [1776] 2009).
The neoliberal economic approach to global civil society focuses on civil
society’s ability to mitigate market failures. Global civil society is most effective when
countering three significant aspects of market failure: the provision of public goods,
rectification of contract failure, and satisfaction of philanthropic demand (Salamon and
Anhier 1998, Teegen, Doh and Vachani 2004).
Public goods are those goods that remain available to all regardless of ability to
pay. Classic examples of public goods include public safety, national security, public
parks, and clean air. Public goods are antithetical to the principles of the market. The
market typically will not provide these goods, but that does not mean that public goods
are not in demand. Governments attempt to meet the demand for public goods. However,
as discussed in the previous section, government often does a poor job of fulfilling these
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demands. In a democracy the provision of public goods tends to focus on the needs of the
median voter; leaving much unsatisfied demand (Weisbrod 1977). Civil society
organizations can leverage both financial capital and social capital generating the
resources and relationships necessary to meet the demand for a diverse range of public
goods and services (Steinberg 2006).
Another market failure addressed by global civil society is contract failure.
Global civil society does not enforce the fine print. It monitors business’s broader
commitment to honesty and transparency, assessing if Starbuck’s coffee is fairly traded
or if De Beer’s diamonds come from war torn countries. The information provided by
global civil society empowers consumers to make educated choices.
As mentioned in the previous section, global civil society often acts as a
watchdog. This role is not limited to tracking government actions. Global civil society
deploy their expertise to monitor whether economic actors are operating ethically as well
(Hansmann 1987). Since civil society organizations are viewed as being motivated by
more than just profits, they garner trust. This trust in turn provides their observations
with credibility (Salamon and Anhier 1998).
Market failures tend to focus on unmet demand. However, some scholars propose
that there may also be an unmet supply of philanthropic impulse. The philanthropic
impulse arising from a feeling of solidarity or religious passion does not have a ready
outlet in the market. Global civil society organizations offer a way to express this impulse
toward a larger community. They also provide a way to maximize the impact of
philanthropy through collective actions (James 1987). According to neoliberal economic
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understanding, global civil society is a self-interested realm of freedom, production, and
exchange. These groups coalesce to enable members to fill unmet needs or achieve
specific rational goals (Ehrenberg 1999).
The alternative development group of scholars envisions a different global civil
society. For these scholars global civil society becomes a way to counter balance the
negative effects of capitalism. The anti-globalization movement offers an example of
global civil society actions organized around this theoretical framework. Civil society is a
network of associations, organizations, and movements, seeking to amplify the voice of
marginalized populations in a global economic system. These scholars draw their
theoretical foundations from scholars like Karl Marx, Fredrick Hegel, Antonio Gramsci,
and Karl Polanyi.
Both Marx and Hegel considered civil society and the state to be under the
influence of the market (bourgeoisie). According to Hegel, civil society is an alienating
and unjust sphere that leaves the individual powerless to determine whether his needs are
filled (Ehrenberg 1999). Marx concurred, “Civil society … develops with the
bourgeoisie; the social organizations evolving directly out of production and commerce,
which in all ages forms the basis of the state” (Marx [1846]1978, 163). Marx considered
the democratization and liberation of civil society as a core objective of the proletarian
revolution for general human emancipation. Human emancipation could only be led by
that group in society that sets itself apart from the status quo. The proletarian revolution
would not only reform modes of production, but civil society as well, replacing the
bourgeois markets based network with an associational space that quashes all class based
antagonism (Ehrenberg 1999, Cohen and Arato 1992). Contemporary scholars present the
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anti-globalization movement as the manifestation of a liberated civil society now free to
contest the markets control over the government as well as the economy.
Antonio Gramsci theorized a complex role for civil society, mediating between
the political and economic realms (Katz 2006). Gramscian civil society includes not only
organizations, which contest the current political economic climate, but also those with
an interest in preserving the status quo. The Gramscian understanding of civil society
provides the foundation for skepticism about the ability of global civil society
organizations supported by developed countries to adequately represent the interests of
marginalized populations in the developing world.
Karl Polanyi offers a more empowered understanding of global civil society. His
work expands on Marx’s idea of a liberated civil society.
“Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the result of a double
movement… While on one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe and
the amount of good involved grew to unbelievable dimensions, on the other hand
a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions
designed to check the action of the market relative to labor, land, and money… a
deep-seated movement sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of a
market-controlled economy. Society protected itself against the perils inherent in
a self-regulating market system – this was the one comprehensive feature in the
history of the age” (Polanyi [1944] 2001, 79-80).
Global civil society represents the second phase of the double movement. As a
result of increased economic integration, the state is limited in its ability to buffer society
from the devastation of the market. Global civil society actors prompt the state to
remember its responsibilities to all its citizens. By “movement”, Polanyi means
something more than organized protests, petition drives or lobbying; he means a
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hegemonic struggle to define the cultural and ideological underpinnings that determine
the general direction of society (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, 597).
Peter Evans identified four traits global civil society should exhibit if it is to
function as the second half of Polanyi’s double movement. First, global civil society must
transcend not only national boundaries, but the development divide as well. Secondly,
global civil society must promote a holistic response to economic liberalism, weaving a
network of diverse constituencies without losing the capacity for focused collective
action. Third, global civil society must be equally capable of engaging with the policy
processes at the national, regional, international, and transnational levels. Lastly, global
civil society must communicate its message in a framework that can capture the
collective imagination (Evans 2008, 287).
“The reduction of transnational barriers to economic exchange forces states to
revoke long-standing social contracts that protect citizens from the ruthlessness of the
free market” (Danzer 2001, 53). According to the alternative development approach civil
society and the state should be mutually reinforcing. However, when the state primarily
serves the market, civil society becomes isolated. Civil society must act as a communal
response to impersonal economic forces. The cooptation of the state by the market pushes
civil society into an antagonistic relationship with the state.
Both economic approaches to global civil society easily translate to a global
perspective. Since the market is a global phenomenon, a civil society responding to either
its failures or its excesses would need to operate at the global level as well (Evans 2000).
Global civil society influences policy through a multilevel approach initiating protests of
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international economic organizations such as the World Bank and the WTO as well as
leveraging domestic power relationships to endorse policy alternatives (Broome 2009).
The economic integration of the new millennium has come with a specific free
market agenda. International trade agreements regulating investment (TRIMS), services
(GATS), and intellectual property (TRIPS) have constrained the development strategies
of less developed countries. The result is that the “development space” for emerging
economies has shrunk (Wade 2003, 621-622).
There is much debate about neoliberal economic reforms’ ability to produce
economic development for all countries. The traditional neoclassical theory predicts that
economic liberalization of both trade and investment will promote economic
development (Cleeve, Debrah and Yiheyis 2015). A 2013 study by Lehnert,
Benmamoun, and Zhao identified a positive relationship between FDI inflows and the
host country’s social wellbeing. They confirmed that FDI encourages a transfer of
knowledge and technology between the investing corporations and the host country.
However, this positive effect is limited by the host country’s ability to absorb the
information spill-over (Lehnert, Benmamoun and Zhao 2013).
A study by White and Leavy indicates that there may still be significant room for
national discretion in economic policy. Their analysis of twenty countries found that
adopters of neoliberal economic reforms did indeed perform better economically than
those countries that continued to operate command economies. However, they did not
find any significant difference between countries that weakly adopted these policies and

95 |Hosto-Marti

those countries that whole-hearted embraced economic liberalism (White and Leavy
2001).
Still other scholars contend that countries that have achieved the most success in
the globalizing economy are countries that have cultivated a distinctive system of
economic liberalization - the East Asian development states. These states have the
administrative capacity to control the manifestation of foreign investment in their
economies (Evans 1997, Haggard 2004).
Another group of scholars identify a country’s position in the international
production structure as accounting for their ability to develop autonomously. Commodity
producers’ position in the international production chain limits their ability to convert raw
materials into value added products such steel, plastics, or microchips, placing them in a
position of economic dependency. These countries are prevented from implementing
similar protectionist practices previously employed by developed nations to nurture
domestic industries (Chang 2002, Stiglitz 2002, Stiglitz and Charlton 2005).
“We see that the alleged backwardness of these economies is not due to a lack of
integration with capitalism, but that to the contrary, the most powerful obstacles
to their full development come from the way in which they are joined to this
international system and its laws of development” (Dos Santos 1970, 235).
Global civil society can overcome collective action barriers, which reduce the
effectiveness of developing nation cooperation (Wade 2003). There is strength in
numbers. A single developing nation can exert only minimal influence over international
economic negotiations, but collectively developing countries can bring economic
negotiations to a standstill, as they did with the 2001 Doha development round. Global
civil society helps developing states overcome administrative deficits, which reduce their
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ability to influence the nature of economic development within their borders (Evans
1992).
Scholars have observed global civil society in action as facilitators of business
development opportunities for the poor. When the market fails to provide a service, not
due to a lack of demand, but due to an unappealing profit margin, global civil society
organizations step in and fill this market gap (Matkita 2009). One of the most glaring
market gaps is the underutilization of women in market activities. Global civil society
stepped in to address this unmet need, providing employment opportunities as well access
to credit and other banking services directly to women (Sen 2000, Yunus 2003). Another
area of global civil society involvement has been in health care. Global civil society
expedites the provision of basic health care, particularly HIV/AIDs medications.
Global civil society also mitigates information asymmetry within the market by
pressuring multinational corporations to adopt socially responsible modes of business. It
was instrumental in launching the United Nations Global Compact, which established a
framework of practices that comply with “universally shared norms” regarding human
rights, labor protections, environmental stewardship, and corruption (May 2006, Huws
2006, Ward 2007). Global civil society provides difficult to obtain information, such as
the origins of diamonds, sweatshop labor practices, and environmental impact of forestry
and mining practices directly to consumers, enabling them to make more informed
economic decisions (Pegg 2006, Webb 2006, Brooks 2005).
Some scholars question both the motives and capacity of global civil society to
correct market failures or ensure development. “By promising what they cannot deliver
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… “rich world activists prolong the true nightmare of poverty” (Eberly 2008). Other
scholars have questioned if the development alternatives proposed by global civil society
are actually in the best interest of the marginalized countries they purport to represent.
Global civil society has been accused of valuing abstract moral imperative over the
practical needs of the people. Global civil society’s intransigence has been blamed for
stymieing economic growth and blocking global trade negotiations (Bhagwati 2001,
Bhagwati 2004, Mallaby 2004, Mallaby 2004).
Global civil society is permeated by the ethos of the capitalist market, that of selfserving and instrumental action. Furthermore, global civil society’s alternatives still
require nation-states to enact laws or regulations to achieve full effect. Some global civil
society organizations resist attempts to make their actions and operations transparent, at
the same time they demand transparency from other corporations and government
(Chandhoke 2002). Susan Sell proposes that business agents and global civil society
actors do not require separate frameworks to explain their actions. Both organizations
seek to frame/market their ideas to secure material support whether in the form of
donations or payments. In addition, she points out that some global civil society actors,
such as unions, offer purely materialistic benefits (wage increases) exclusively for
members (Sell and Prakash 2004).
Some scholars are also critical of global civil society’s ability to offer an
alternative development model to economic liberalization.
“Organizations are formed by agents who seek to resist or moderate the
expansion of the market into various realms of social life, but these organizations
may act in ways that, unwittingly perhaps, support the logic of the market and its
further expansion” (Lipschultz 2004, 748),
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Global civil society cannot exist without a liberal system; a liberal system cannot exist
without global civil society. They are both supported by the classic liberal tenants of
autonomy and the rule of law. They are mutually constituted, the legitimacy of each
enhanced by its interaction with the other (Lipschultz 2004).
Jurgen Habermas focused on global civil society as an inclusive and open
discursive space. Marginalized populations need organizations to intercede on their
behalf with their governments as well as international governing institutions.
“[T]he democratic procedure no longer draws its legitimizing force only, indeed
not even predominately, from political participation and the expression of
political will, but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative process”
(Habermas 2001, 110).
Global civil society increases the economic discursive space providing countries with
room to develop a customized policy (Evans 2004). Its greatest influence is on public
opinion; maximizing its ability to raise awareness over environmental and social impacts
of economic policies (Anner 2004, Turner 1998).
Much of the research on global civil society alternative globalization efforts
comes from case studies of anti-globalization campaigns. The case study literature has
identified profound differences between global civil society’s actors originating in
developing countries (South) compared to those originating in developed countries
(North). These groups differ in regards to bonds of solidarity, resources, preferred policy
outcomes, and the relationship to the state. The ability of global civil society to bridge
these differences determines their success.
Particularly in the global justice movement, southern actors in global civil society
are bound by identity solidarity. This type of solidarity develops when people share the
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same fate, threat, or suffer equally the harm of the injustice. Northern actors are bound by
reciprocal solidarity that comes when actors make a connection between the suffering of
others and their plight (Reitan 2007).
This difference in solidarity produces different policy preferences for addressing
issues of global economic injustice. Since economic injustices tend to threaten the way of
life directly in developing countries, southern global civil society organizations tend to
operate from a materialist perspective. Since the harm of the injustice tends to have a
more indirect effect on northern global civil society groups, they tend to operate from a
post-materialist perspective. For example, when addressing issues of tropical
deforestation southern global civil society actors will highlight issues of sustainable
agriculture and food independence, in other words, “environmentalism of survival and
livelihood”. On the other hand northern global civil society actors may focus on issues of
endangered species or global warming, in other words, the “environmentalism of
affluence and enhancement of quality of life” (Faber 2005).
The minimal success and ultimate dissolution of the Jubilee 2000 movement
illustrates this tension. The movement was successful in securing $110 billion in
promises of debt forgiveness for highly indebted poor countries; however, this “success”
split the movement along north-south lines. Northern activists viewed the offer of debt
forgiveness, despite the strings attached, as victory, whereas southern activists could not
accept the structural adjustment programs required by the debt forgiveness plan (Reitan
2007, Donnelly 2002).
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Global civil society is not a homogenized, universal force. Failure to acknowledge
diversity risks undermining its power to motivate change (Macdonald 2005). Despite
differences, global civil society has demonstrated its ability to bridge gaps in ideology,
resources, and motivations. The success of the World Social Forum exemplifies the
ability of global civil society to promote cooperation without requiring a convergence of
message, method, or structure (Wood 2005).
The disparity in the distribution of global civil society between developed and
developing countries, as well as their divergence in framework and tactic, validates the
need for multiple models. This study divides the inclusive dataset based on World Bank
income classifications to see if globalization indictors behave differently when examined
in divergent economic setting.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: HYPOTHESES
The economic integration hypotheses predict that to attract foreign investment and
trade opportunities a country must make certain concessions to the doctrine of economic
liberalization. These concessions limit a country’s ability to protect the environment,
domestic businesses, and labor from the destructive potential of competition. This
explanation draws support from the theory proposed by Karl Polanyi that when a state
becomes too enmeshed with the market; it fails to buffer citizens from negative
externalities such as environmental destruction, falling wages, and lacks occupational
safety regulations. Societal forces organize to pressure government for those protections
(Polanyi [1944] 2001). As a country integrates into the global free-market economy, its
economic autonomy, as well as its ability to buffer citizens from the negative impacts of
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market force is reduced. This lack of government responsiveness will lead to an increase
in the number of INGOs as society organizes to challenge the state’s relationship to the
market (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009).
Other scholars argue that participation in the global economy does not require
countries automatically to adopt international policy preferences at the domestic level.
The research of Garret and Lange (1995) identified several factors, including a country’s
position in the global economy, national socio-economic, and formal public institutions
that influence that country’s ability to adapt to changes in the global economy. Swank
(2001) found little evidence that capital mobility exerts downward pressures on the
provision of public services and other welfare state programs. Both of these scholars
observed that certain types of public services such as infrastructure improvements and
income inequality reduction can actually make the national economy more attractive to
foreign investment (Garrett and Lange 1995, Swank 2001). However, implicit in both
these studies is the reality that some countries have more economic policy freedom than
others. Less developed countries are more likely to lack the economic clout and the
national institutions necessary to chart a customized development course.
This relationship is measured by two components of economic liberalization,
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). The present study hypothesizes that as trade,
when measured as a percent of GDP, increases the number of INGOs will also increase.
The same is assumed for FDI inflows. As the amount of FDI coming into a country
increases, the number of INGOs operating in that country will also increase.
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Both the neoliberal and the alternative development theories predict that increased
economic integration should promote global civil society growth. The neoliberal theory
stresses global civil society’s ability to mitigate market failures, whereas the alternative
development theory focuses on global civil society ability to buffer society from the
negative impacts of a self-regulating market.
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: VARIABLES
This study tests the relationship between integration in the global economy and
the vibrancy of global civil society. To measure the degree to which a country’s economy
is impacted by international trade and, by extension, the rules and obligations governing
trade, this study utilizes data from the World Bank Global Economic indicators (World
Bank 2012). Economic integration will be measured by two factors: trade and FDI
inflows. Not only do these economic activities require interaction with other countries,
but they also often come with specific rules of engagement that can limit economic policy
options.
The literature predicts that a greater reliance on trade will increase a country’s
vulnerability to externally induced economic shocks. The literature also suggests that
international rules governing trade limit the economic policy options available to trade
dependent economies, especially when those economies are still developing. This
literature suggests that countries with a higher percentage of GDP derived from trade will
have a larger global civil society presence (Evans 1997),
Both classical as well as alternative development economic theories inform this
line of investigation. Classical economic theory proposes that global civil society can
103 |Hosto-Marti

address issues of market failure. These organizations form to meet needs that are either
unprofitable or unmanageable and thereby not provided by market forces. Arts and
cultural organizations frequently conform to this theory.
Alternative development theory, building off the work of Karl Polanyi, predicts
that global civil society represents society’s reaction to the negative impact of market
forces. In order to participate in the global economy, countries must comply with certain
international agreements, which lay out the rules of the engagement. These rules limit
both fiscal and economic policy options available to countries. These limitations are
particularly burdensome for developing countries, because they block off paths to
development employed by developed nations, such as certain types of protectionism,
creating a disconnection between the government and its people, while at the same time,
making domestic economies more vulnerable to international shocks (Evans 2008, Chang
2002).
The box plots illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the explanatory
variables, as well as demonstrations the influence of outlying values. The horizontal line
at the center of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the relative extreme
values. The individual points identify outlying values.
Highly economically integrated countries are defined as countries that rely on
trade for more than 50% of their GDP. The descriptive statistics indicate little difference
between these two groups. Highly integrated countries tend to host fewer (617) INGOs
on average than less integrated countries (890). The data for both groups shows little
variance with much of the data concentrated around the mean.
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FIGURE 16

Sources: Union of International Associations and World Bank Global Economic Indicators

Another measure of economic integration is foreign direct investments. The
pursuit of foreign investment is fraught with even more policy compromise than trade
agreements. Host countries need to create a “favorable” business climate, which usually
entails low tax rates and limited regulations.
Again, we see (Figure 17) no difference in mean number of INGOs between
countries with low rates of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP (<3.6%) and countries
with higher reliance on FDI inflows. In fact the data distributions for the two groups are
remarkably similar.
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FIGURE 17
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GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: RESULTS
Political Integration Theory: As a country integrates into the neo-liberal global
economy and exercises less economic autonomy, the number of INGOs operating
in that country will increase.
H3a - As trade, measured by the percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), increases
in a country the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase
H3b - As the gross inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), measured by the percent
of GDP, increases in a country, the number of INGOs operating in that country will
increase
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This study finds little support for the theories that predict a relationship between
economic integration and the expansion of global civil society. Normally the lack of
statistical significance would not be remarkable; however, due to the prevalence of this
explanation in the case study literature, this finding is substantively interesting.
In the inclusive model neither trade as percent of GDP nor inflows of foreign
direct investment as a percent of GDP, is statistically significant. Although not
statistically significant the direction of the relationship is interesting. The relationship
between trade and INGO numbers is negative, which is counterintuitive to the literature
and theories. The negative relationship identified in the inclusive model, as well as the
low income country model, raises the question of how economic integration can reduce
the influence of global civil society. The theories offer no explanation for how or why
trade might reduce global civil society impact.
A statistical reason for this incongruent finding is easily explained. After
reviewing the scatter plots of the data, the explanation for the reversal of the direction of
causality is likely a factor of the data. A majority of the observations cluster around the
lower end of the trade, increasing the likelihood that these same countries will have
relatively smaller numbers of INGOs, thereby causing the negative relationship.
However, a substantive reason for the finding is less obvious.
. Again the literature and theory, particularly Polanyi’s work, predict a
relationship between the loss of policy autonomy and a rise in collective action to protest
this loss of economic independence. Even though previous attempts to capture this
relationship have used the same variables, trade and FDI inflows may not accurately
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measure a loss of policy autonomy. How a country adapts to the process of economic
liberalization may be unique, thereby best captured in case study analysis.
FIGURE 18

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

Unlike the INC model economic integration is supported by the LIC model. The
FDI inflows variable is statistically significant and the positive direction of the
relationship is consistent with both theories of economic integration. For every
additional unit increase in trade as a percent of GDP the number of INGOs increases by
.01%. However, this result is not substantively significant. Trade would need to increase
dramatically before adding a single INGO.
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FIGURE 19

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

One possible practical explanation of differing results across the models, is that
lower income countries tend to have less diverse economies. Less economic
diversification means that each sector of the economy has more singular influence,
making developing economies dispropotionately vulnerable to economic shocks, such as
commodity booms and busts. It is likewise reasonable to expect FDI to have more
influence on lower income countries, since these countries will have less domestic
investment to offset the influence FDI.
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FIGURE 20

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

Trade is statistically significant in the HIC model. A one unit change in trade as a
percent of GDP increases the number of INGOs by .1%. However, this is a substantively
minor change. An exponential increase in the percent of GDP derived from trade, would
be required before adding a single INGO.
SUMMARY
The findings of this study raise questions about the explanatory power of the
economic integration approach to global civil society expansion. Has the antiglobalization movement underestimate the degree of policy freedoms possible within an
110 |Hosto-Marti

economic liberalization agenda? The results are mixed. Neither of the variables, trade or
FDI inflows, used to measure economic integration is statistically significant in the
inclusive model. However, FDI is statistically significant for lower income countries and
trade is statistically significant for high income countries, but the substantive change is so
small as to make the findings weak.
These findings are not enough evidence to refute the economic integration
explanation or the case study evidence, but they do encourage skepticism about global
civil society’s presumptive “white hat” status. Global civil society might not be the
manifestation of Polanyi’s double movement; instead global civil socity might be
motivated by its own material concerns such as self-preservation. The raison d’etre for
the anti-globalization movement is that they speak for those excluded from the benefits of
economic liberalization. These findings indicate that a closer examination of global civil
society’s motives in the area of economic policy might be useful.
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CHAPTER SIX: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY and National Capacity
The revolution will be televised, or at least tweeted. Interactive communications
in a practically wireless world gives voice to the previously voiceless. Flash mobilization
has played an important role in citizen uprisings. Examples of cyber activism include text
messages inciting people into the streets during Manila’s 2001 “People Power II” protests
(Castells, et al. 2006); the efforts of the cyber hacktivist group Anonymous to protect net
neutrality (Glasius and Players 2013); and most memorably, the viral video of
Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, which sparked the Arab Spring of protest (Al
Jazeera 2011). A new era of global civil society activism has been born.
Advances in technology have drawn the world closer than even before. Global
civil society has used these new tools to distribute information, to develop a common
language for articulating demands, to encourage repertoires of contention, and to provoke
action. The world could watch a live Facebook feed of the protests in Tahrir Square,
producing instant awareness and possibly a sense of cyber-solidarity.
NATIONAL CAPACITY: LITERATURE REVIEW
This study tests competing explanations for the recent dynamic growth of global
civil society in both numbers and influence against each other. However, it is possible
that none of these normative theories actually explain the reason for global civil society’s
expansion. It is possible that democratic advancement, economic integration, and
increased international political cooperation are all positive side effects of a modernizing
world. Simply put, countries with more resources can support an active and growing
global civil society. National capacity could explain most of the disparity between the
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numbers of INGOs operating in developed nations as compared to developing nations.
The national capacity explanation received theoretical support from modernization
theory.
Modernization theory connects economic advancement with the
institutionalization of property rights leading to demands for political rights.
Modernization theory and civil society share a common concept that government and the
market should be separate, allowing each to function in its own sphere. Instead of a
normative justification, modernization scholars see individual utility as the organizing
principle of civil society. Individuals seeking to maximize their utility will work
collectively to improve the chances of achieving their objectives. Since the focus of this
explanation is on the individual, this explanation easily extends civil society to a global
phenomenon.
Modernization theory maintains that industrialization, urbanization, and
economic development lead directly to positive social and political change represented in
this case by a thriving civil society. “Thus the factors involved in modernization or
economic development are linked to those which establish legitimacy and tolerance”
(Lipset 1981, 79). Critics of modernization theory maintain that its structural-functional
approach to development focuses on the system to the exclusion of agents whose power
derives from their success in competing over limited resources (Rueschemeyer, Stephens
and Stephens 1992).
The first stage of modernization is for a country to abandon feudalism or other
forms of caste organization. Individuals without ownership of their lives are incapable of
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developing meaningful and lasting associations. Not all paths of modernization produce
an environment conducive to the growth of civil society. Barrington Moore identified that
economic modernization led by the middle classes was more likely to lead to a more open
and inclusive society (Moore 1966).
“Capitalist development furthers the growth of civil society – by increasing the
level of urbanization, by bringing workers together in factories, by improving the
means of communication and transportation, and by raising the level of literacy.
Strengthening the organization and organizational capacity of the working and
middle classes serve to empower those classes and thus change the balance of
class power” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992, 6).
On the other hand modernization led by elites will tend to lead to fascism. This path of
modernization may exhibit the trappings of democracy including elections and the
semblance of civil society, as seen in the Weimar Republic, but still exclude the poor and
middle classes from full political participation. Elite led economic modernization
completely lacks the associational freedoms necessary for a vibrant civil society due to
the entrenched interest of the ruling elite (Moore 1966).
Technological advancements have reduced the cost of communication and travel,
enabling individuals to act outside of national boundaries (Glasius and Players 2013).
Nations face policy problems that defy unilateral solutions. Regional and global
interconnectedness challenges the viability and accountability of unilateral decisionmaking. At the same time, supranational governing bodies reduce the range of decisionmaking options available to national governments (Evans 1997).
A sub-field of research on global civil society has explored the specific
implications of technological on global civil society. “Interactive electronic
communication, and practically wireless communication provides a powerful platform for
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political autonomy” (Castells, et al. 2006, 266). Modern communication encourages
people to speak out in more freely than ever before. Castells et al. also observed that the
ease of communication reduces geographic distances; allowing members of a diaspora
community to participate in social movement via the internet (Castells, et al. 2006).
Not unlike globalization itself, media activism is nothing new, but the recent
manifestation is more interactive and independent than previous incarnations. Television
provided vivid images of the suffering in the Cambodian killing fields and the Ethiopian
famine (Sotharith 2002). Today’s media is different; never before has there been so much
direct control over the timing and content of the coverage. With a smartphone, protestors
can become their own reporters, videographer, and distributors, enabling them to
circumvent media censorship and official government spin.
This new cyber-civil society is not without its limitations. The World Wide Web
can overcome barriers of time and space, but at the same time it can obstruct authenticity.
There is a logical reason why technologically enhanced experiences are referred to as
virtual. They are not real, raising questions of the authenticity and durability of internet
enhanced social movements. These “’new’ social movements tend to emphasize longterm utopian visions over the attainment of immediate, concrete, and limited goals”
(Glasius and Players 2013, 562). These pie in the sky aspirations can lead to frustration
when these visions are not realized.
The digital divide is alive and well in global civil society. The internet has the
potential to increase citizen participation by reducing the major barriers to participation,
such as “no one asked”, “do not have enough time”, and “do not know enough about the
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topic”. Internet campaigns can overcome all three of these barriers. A well-crafted email
can entice citizens to want to take action; provide them with the justification for that
action; provide them with the mechanism to take action; and allow them to take that
action anytime day or night (Scholzman, Verba and Brady 2010). However, not
everyone has access to these technological advancements. Socio-economic status is an
essential determinant of political participation. A person’s status not only determines
their ability to access the hardware necessary to benefit from technology, but it also
influences that person’s capacity to comprehend complex policy issues (Scholzman,
Verba and Brady 2010).
NATIONAL CAPACITY: HYPOTHESES
This study does not apply an orthodox interpretation of modernization theory, but
uses it as the foundation for examining the resources necessary to support and maintain a
flourishing civil society. To test this assumption this study includes measures of income,
social development, urbanization, and technology in all three models.
Based on the national capacity explanation, we would expect to see a positive
relationship between each of the variables measuring national capacity and global civil
society. An increase in GDP means that a nation has the monetary resources to support
global civil society, so an increase in GDP per capita should produce a corresponding
increase in the number of INGOs operating in that country. Likewise increased access to
technology reduces some of the costs of political participation. As the technology index
for a particular country increases, so should the number of INGOs operating in that
country. Countries with high level of social development will have more human capital
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resources available to support global civil society development, so as the social
development index increase so will the number of INGOs operating in that country.
Lastly, as a country’s population becomes more urban, their reliance on traditional
arrangements of social support will be replaced by formal organization, often member of
global civil society. As a result we should see the number of INGO increase as the
percentage of people living in urban conditions also increases.
NATIONAL CAPACITY: VARIABLES
National capacity measures economic, social, and technical capacity to capture its
influence on global civil society advancement. Economic capacity will be measured by
GDP per capita. Social capacity is measured by urbanization and an index that includes
measures of education and life expectancy. Technology capacity is measured by an index
calculated based on the number of users of the internet and cellular phones.
Once again the World Bank Global Economic Indicators database provides the
data for all variables measuring modernization. (World Bank 2012) Modernization in
this study is focused on measuring the resources available for a country to support global
civil society activity. Economic development is measured using gross domestic product
per capita. While not a perfect measure of economic development, this variable is
consistently calculated and available for most countries. The ability of a country to
support global civil society through donations is reliant on a nation’s wealth.
Social development is measured by a simple index incorporating life expectancy
and percent of the population enrolled in secondary education. These two factors are
intended roughly to assess the human capital of a country. The United Nations Human
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Development Index (HDI), incorporates similar variables and includes a measure of
quality of life gross national income (GNI) (United Nations Development Programme
2013). The current study chose to calculate an alternative index to reduce correlation
with the GDP per capita measure and the HDI. In other words do countries have the
organizational and intellectual capacity to support global civil society?
Urbanization is another indication of modernization. This study uses the percent
of population living in urban environments. In modernization theory urbanization is seen
as an indicator of a shift away from a primarily agrarian economy to a diversified
economy. As people migrate from rural smaller communities to the larger cities, they are
also moving away from tradition sources of social support such as the clan and toward
less intimate sources such as churches, ethnic societies, and recreational clubs. In other
words, a more urbanized population is more likely to rely on civil society to meet social
needs.
Finally, technical modernization is also measured with a simple index including
the number of internet and mobile phone users per 1000 people. There is a high
correlation between internet and mobile phone use because many people access the
internet using a mobile phone. For that reason an index was essential to minimize the
distortion caused by high correlation. This variable is intended to measure the degree to
which a country will benefit from reduced information and travel costs and participate in
the new cyber civil society.
These variables are not only important for testing the national capacity
explanation, but are essential to test for spuriousness in the other relationships. As

118 |Hosto-Marti

observed earlier global civil society tends to be concentrated in economically developed
countries. If can national capacity reduces the explanatory power of the other approaches,
it is reasonable to assume that the relationships correlate with national wealth.
The box plots, below, illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the explanatory
variables, as well as demonstrations the influence of outlying values. The horizontal line
at the center of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the relative extreme
values. The individual points identify outlying values.
Since neither social development nor urbanization achieve statically significance
in any of the models those variables will not be discussed here. It is likely that their lack
of significance could be attributed to the level of correlation between these variables and
GDP.
FIGURE 21
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The box plot illustrates significant differences between global civil society
operating in developed and developing countries. Developed countries are defined as
countries with GDP per capita above the dataset median of $2,224. Likewise developing
countries are defined as countries with a GDP per capita at or below the dataset median.
Developed countries host an average of three times as many INGOs (981) as developing
countries (397). Developed countries also offer the widest variance in observations,
while developing countries’ observations tend to cluster around the mean.
FIGURE 22
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There is also a statistical difference in mean for the technology index. High tech
countries are defined as those countries with a tech index score above the mean of -.098
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and low tech countries are those countries with a tech index score below the dataset
mean. High tech countries average nearly three times as many INGOs (1263) as low tech
countries (543). The box graph also indicates that low tech have a smaller range than high
tech countries. Outlying observations also influence the mean of low tech countries.
NATIONAL CAPACITY: RESULTS
National Capacity – a control thesis: As a country modernizes the number of
INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H4a - As a country’s GDP, measured per capita, increases, the number of INGOs
operating in that country will increase.
H4b - As the technological capacity, measured by number of internet and mobile phone
users per 1000 people in a country, increases the number of INGOs operating in that
country will increase.
H4c - As a country develops human capital, as measured by education and life
expectancy, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase
H4d – As a country becomes more urbanized the number of INGOs will increase.

In the inclusive model two of the four variables are statistically significant wealth and access to technology. In the case of GDP per capita, a 100% increase in GDP
per capita also increases the number of INGOs by 15%. Since GDP per capita tends to
correlate with social development and urbanization, it is not surprising that other
variables used to measure national capacity did not achieve statistical significance. (See
Appendix)
In the case of access to technology a one unit change toward greater technological
access on the index results in a 19% increase in the number of INGOs. A significant
amount of literature has focused on the role that technology, particularly mobile
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communication and internet access, has played in recent expression of global civil
society. Mobile phones and social media were essential in coordinating the protests of
the Arab Spring from Tunisia to Tahrir Square (Glasius and Players 2013).
FIGURE 23

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

The national capacity explanation produces similar results to the LIC model.
When GDP per capita increases by 100% it generates a 13% increase in the number of
INGOs, which is less than the 15% increase seen in the INC model. On the other hand
access to technology seems to have a greater impact on low income countries than it does
on the world as a whole. For every one unit change toward greater use of technology on
the index, the number of INGOs increase by 31% as compared to a 19% increase in the
inclusive model. One possible explanation for this difference is second mover advantage.
In less developed countries people are experiencing a qualitative difference in access,
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moving from no phone access to a mobile phone as opposed to simply moving from
landlines to a newer version of telecommunication.
FIGURE 24

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

In the HIC model none of the modernization variables achieve statistical
significance this is likely because there is less variation in these variables among
wealthier countries.
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FIGURE 25

Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the
United Nations' Treaty Database

SUMMARY
The present study confirms that national capacity plays an important role in the
growth of global civil society. The ease of the transfer of information has drawn the
globe together as never before. The smart phone has made it possible for protestors to
not only be activists but media outlets as well. While not every variable measuring
national capacity was statistically significant, those that are produce substantive change
in the number of INGOS; increasing the number of INGOs by 9-17%.
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National wealth plays an important role in global civil society development. The
result reported here supported by the variation in the results observed across the three
models. Not only does GDP per capita achieve statistical significance in two of the three
models, it produces the variation in results of another significant variables – technology.
The results would indicate that technology’s impact reaches a tipping point and then
produces less dynamic results. We see that technology has a profound influence on
global civil society for less developed countries, where a one unit change in the tech
index produces a 31% increase in the number of INGOs. However, technology is not
statistically significant for high income countries.
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CHAPTER SEVEN – Conclusion
In conclusion the current study successfully tested the four dominant explanations
for the dynamic growth in number and influence of INGOs since mid-century:
democratic expansion, political integration, economic integration, and national capacity.
The inclusive model found that democracy, political integration, and national capacity
variables significantly increased the observed number of INGOs, supporting three of the
four explanations; only economic integration variables did not achieve statistical
significance. The current study contributes significantly to our understanding of global
civil society’s motivation and provide insight into how well these explanations predict the
distribution of INGOs globally. However, these findings are not without caveats and
limitations. The following chapter will review the key findings and contributions of this
study, while discussing its limitation and proposing a research agenda to address some of
these limitations.
A critical finding of this study is that political integration overwhelmingly
influences global civil society vitality. The political integration explanation is the only
one to achieve statistical significance across all three models, with surprisingly dramatic
increases in high income countries. The political integration results can be optimistically
or pessimistically interpreted. The optimistic interpretation suggests that INGOs make
global governance more responsive. By partnering with international governmental
organizations, global civil society organizations insure that marginalized populations
have a say in the implementation of international policy, if not in the formulation. As
service providers they can customize programs to meet local needs and expectations.
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Advocates of global civil society organizations have promoted global civil
society’s ability to preserve the environment, reduce poverty, and speak for the
oppressed. What if the positive relationship between political integration and the number
of INGOs is not the result of a more inclusive international political system, but instead
the result of developed countries outsourcing their “noblesse oblige” to global civil
society.
A more pessimistic interpretation of the political integration results is that global
civil society organizations pursue missions that align with the available funding from
international governmental organizations. For example, an organization interested in
stopping the practice of dowry deaths in India might not find adequate funding to support
this cause; however, this organization discovers significant funding available for
programs encouraging political participation among women in India. As a result, its
mission begins creeping away from the original intent to stop dowry deaths and toward
matters of political empowerment. Both missions could improve the lives of women in
India; nonetheless, the original problem of dowry deaths has become an afterthought.
Skeptics of global civil society have questioned the true altruism of global civil
society organizations’ actions. An organization needs to remain in business in order to
accomplish its mission, yet when self-preservation becomes the focus of the organization
its purpose is lost. Public/private partnerships become less genuine, when the private
partner owes greater allegiance to the public funding source then to the beneficiaries of
the services. These findings by no means discount the potential empowering contribution
of global civil society to global governance, but they do cast enough doubt to encourage
careful evaluations of public private partnerships.
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These findings are especially useful in light of the second major contribution
comprehensive testing of the explanation of global civil society growth. The vast
majority of research on civil society has been narrowly focused, dealing with a small
sampling of countries or a specific mission subsection of organizations. While these
studies provide insight into a sub-section of global civil society, they are not
generalizable to the sector as a whole. Studies that compare the nonprofit sector of
developed countries can tell us little about how these organizations function in less
developed countries. Studies of global civil society organizations focused on human
rights can tell us little about those organizations committed to changing the global
economy and vice versa.
Based on a survey of the literature, this study is only the second study to analyze a
broad cross section of countries and use an inclusive definition of global civil society. As
a result the findings of this study are informative about global civil society organizations
working in any country addressing any policy area. This broad based approach is the best
method for evaluating the competing explanations, because it is free from ideologically
influenced subject selection. The findings contribute to the establishment of common
ground to facilitate the sharing of research across disciplines and subject areas. These
generalizable results do not undermine the more targeted research, but instead help
establish theoretical framework for the sharing and comparing of targeted research.
A caveat to this research is the influence of national wealth on global civil society
distribution. Nearly half of all INGO operate in the 27 developed countries including
Australia, European countries, Canada, Japan, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. As a result of this developed country dominance, national wealth plays a
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significant role in global civil society distribution. This study measures national wealth
using Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, which tends to be correlated with other
measure of economic activity. To help adjust for this influence this study sought to
confirm the findings by retesting the theories on two additional datasets that control for
national income. Most of the findings were replicated; however, the results for
democracy and economic integration were more income dependent.
A preponderance of global civil society research focuses on specific policy areas
or cadres of countries. Such research provides depth of information, but sacrifices
generalizability. In comparison the current study, sacrifices a degree of depth for
generalizability. The finding of this study can be applied broadly to the global civil
society as a whole, but by pursuing a broad understanding, it sacrifices some specifics of
each of these organizations. For example, this study knows the overall number of INGOs
operating in a country, but it does not know how many of those organizations provide
social services, or provide recreational opportunities, or provide environmental
protection. It is reasonable to assume that some of these theories may do a better job of
describing a particular subset of global civil society organizations, rather than the sector
as a whole.
At least one of the three models in this study finds support for each of the four
explanations; however, the support for economic integration is weak. The democratic
explanation has support from two of the three models. The inclusive model finds that
democratic countries have more INGOs. This effect is also observed in the low income
country model and produces a similar rate of increase. However, this effect is absent in
the high income country model. A comparison of the findings indicates that global civil
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society’s relationship to democracy has a tendency to plateau. Once democracy reaches a
level of stability, it no longer promotes significant growth. This finding should be further
investigated to determine the tipping point for democratic governance. An analysis of
global civil society in the newly democratizing countries of the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia could provide that insight.
The political integration explanation offers the most dramatic findings. An
increase of one INGO produces a 3% increase in the number of INGOs regardless of
income level. Treaty adoption has a profound influence on INGO growth. For every
100% increase in the number of treaties signed, the number of INGOs increases by a little
over a third for the inclusive and low income country models, and the effect nearly
doubles to 60% in high income countries. The final variable, Net ODA per capita, is
statistically significant in both the inclusive model and the low income country model; it
is not significant in the high income country model because none of the observations
have information. A 100% increase in Net ODA per capita increases the number of
INGOs by 21% for all countries and by 33% for low income countries. A more detailed
analysis of the composition of global civil society may help unravel the question of
whether these results should be interpreted with an optimistic or pessimistic outlook. For
example, if further analysis find more INGOs committed to an advocacy watchdog
mission than to service delivery, the optimistic interpretation is more valid, but if further
research observes more organizations dedicated to service delivery, such as healthcare or
food pantries, then a more pessimistic interpretation might be warranted.
The results from the national capacity explanation, like the democracy results,
indicate that national capacity, particularly national wealth, has a threshold for
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encouraging global civil society development. This study finds that GDP per capita
increases the number of INGOs in the inclusive model and for low income countries, but
not for high income countries. A one percent increase in GDP per capita produces a
15% increase in the number of INGOs in the inclusive model and only a slightly smaller
increase of 13% in low income countries. GDP per capita is not statistically significant
for high income countries.
Technology, another measure of national capacity, is statistically significant in
two models, but not statistically significant for high income countries. As citizens gain
greater access to technology in the form of internet and cellular phone usage the number
in INGOs increases. A one unit increase on the index increases the number of INGOs by
31% in low income countries; increases the number of INGOs by 19% in all countries.
These findings support the conclusion that national capacity is initially critical to
supporting global civil society growth, but become less influential as country’s economy
modernizes. Further study into the INGO growth in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa, otherwise known as the BRICS, countries could provide additional detail to
this general finding.
The results from the economic integration explanation provide the opportunity for
further investigation. These results are interesting because of what they do not show.
The models shows little statistical support for the economic integration explanation.
Both variables measuring economic integration are not statistically significant in the
inclusive model. The income specific models find statistical support for both trade and
FDI, but not in the same model.
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In the high income country model only trade as percentage of GDP is statistically
significant for every unit increase in trade as a percent of GDP, the number of INGOs
increases by less than one-tenth of one percent. In practical terms, for most countries,
trade would need to contribute 10% more to GDP before adding a single INGO. Since the
high income model includes countries with GDP measured in billions and trillions, this
would take a massive increase in trade to produce a minimal change in the number of
INGOs.
In the low income model FDI inflows, as a percent of GDP per capita, become
statistically significant; every additional 1% of GDP contributed by FDI inflows
increases the number of INGOs in that country by one-tenth of one percent. In practical
terms FDI inflows would need to contribute 10% more to GDP before a single INGO
would be added. Although GDP in this model is lower, measured in millions and not
trillions, the total number of INGOs is also lower, so a comparably massive increase in
FDI inflows is necessary to produce a minor change in the number of INGOs.
While these findings are at odds with the case studies in the anti-globalization
social movement literature, the current study concedes that the lack of findings could be
more technical than substantial. The real question at the heart of the anti-globalization
movement is do countries sacrifice too much economic policy autonomy when they join
the global economy and accept the neo-liberal doctrine of free trade and minimal
regulations. Adherence to this doctrine restricts policy options available to national
governments. This lack of policy autonomy is not limited to matters of tariffs and
interest rates, but also to matters of worker and environmental protection. The variables
used in this study might not accurately capture this lack of policy autonomy. Until a more
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reliable measure of economic and fiscal policy freedom can be created at the national
level, it might not be possible to test the economic integration explanation on a global
level.
Correcting this measurement discrepancy suggests the need for further research.
It might be possible to create an economy policy autonomy index, which could account
for policies such as tariff rates, joint venture requirements, intellectual property
enforcement, and relative strength of labor or environmental protections as a way to
uncover the extent to which policy choices are actually curtailed by participation in the
global economy. With this new measure studies could identify if global civil society
actors organize efforts to counteract limitations in these specific policy areas.
This study does the unglamorous work of theory verification, providing the most
inclusive analysis of global civil society and globalization. The results confirm that the
relationships between democratic expansion, political integration, and national capacity
are genuine and generalizable. This study contributed to the foundation of global civil
society research. However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, to achieve
generalizability this study necessarily sacrificed a degree of specificity. These general
findings encourage additional focused research to add context, thereby enhancing the
practical use of this research.
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Appendix
Inclusive Model Correlation Results 1

. cor ngo polity2 igo treaty trade gdppc socdel pop tech urbanpop fdiin fdiout netodapc
(obs=1281)
ngo polity2
ngo
polity2
igo
treaty
trade
gdppc
socdel
pop
tech
urbanpop
fdiin
fdiout
netodapc

igo

trade

gdppc

socdel

1.0000
0.3305 1.0000
0.5142 -0.1464 1.0000
0.7632 0.3271 0.4401 1.0000
-0.3060 -0.1145 -0.4171 -0.2481 1.0000
0.2795 0.0731 0.0293 0.1678 0.2628 1.0000
0.4357 0.2373 0.0607 0.3260 0.1965 0.5736 1.0000
0.3717 -0.0921 0.1160 0.2912 -0.2343 -0.1321 0.0150
0.3447 0.1660 0.0962 0.4385 0.1448 0.4428 0.4284
0.4086 0.1033 0.2939 0.2568 0.0499 0.5956 0.6430
-0.0699 0.0086 -0.2431 0.0186 0.3324 0.1227 0.2391
0.0004 0.0201 -0.0201 0.0203 0.0758 0.1003 0.0601
-0.3536 0.0093 -0.3485 -0.2938 0.1908 -0.0130 -0.0260
netodapc

netodapc

treaty

1.0000

HIC Model Correlation Results 1
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tech urbanpop

fdiin

fdiout

1.0000
-0.0406 1.0000
-0.1479 0.2739 1.0000
-0.0528 0.2599 0.1089
-0.0124 0.1009 0.0259
-0.1787 -0.0275 -0.0323

1.0000
0.0881
0.1761

1.0000
0.0206

pop

LIC Model Correlation Results 1

. cor ngo polity2 igo treaty trade gdppc socdel pop tech urbanpop fdiin fdiout netodapc
(obs=911)
ngo polity2
ngo
polity2
igo
treaty
trade
gdppc
socdel
pop
tech
urbanpop
fdiin
fdiout
netodapc

1.0000
0.1868
0.5637
0.7451
-0.3377
0.2956
0.4095
0.5237
0.2541
0.3070
-0.1029
0.0115
-0.3964
netodapc

netodapc

1.0000
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1.0000
-0.2169
0.1786
-0.0340
0.1752
0.2272
-0.1127
0.1228
0.1892
0.0024
-0.0727
0.1013

igo

treaty

trade

gdppc

socdel

pop

1.0000
0.4559 1.0000
-0.4425 -0.1987 1.0000
0.0665 0.3015 0.1799 1.0000
0.0453 0.3190 0.1921 0.5828
0.1109 0.3402 -0.2701 -0.1039
0.0559 0.4077 0.2029 0.5854
0.3142 0.3051 -0.0121 0.6057
-0.2534 0.0081 0.3524 0.1662
-0.0770 0.0609 0.1121 0.1092
-0.3658 -0.3092 0.2414 -0.0041

1.0000
0.0887
0.4425
0.5921
0.2771
0.0629
0.0432

1.0000
-0.0153
-0.1307
-0.0514
0.0229
-0.2112

tech urbanpop

1.0000
0.3049
0.2809
0.1155
0.0486

1.0000
0.1710
0.0381
0.0250

fdiin

fdiout

1.0000
0.4665 1.0000
0.1946 -0.0331

FIGURE 26: Regression Table

Four Model Comparison
Effects of Globalization on INGO Growth
Prais-Winsten Regression (PCSEs)

Inclusive INGO Model

Variable

Inclusive Democracy Model

Standard
Error

Coefficient

INGO (ln)

Standard
Error

Coefficient

High Income Country Model
Standard
Error

Coefficient

Low Income Country Model
Standard
Error

Coefficient

-

2.401183*

.5864354

-

-

-

-

Polity 2

.0167325*

.003069

-

-

.0085703

.0046458

.0140506*

.0029422

IGO

.0289845*

.0030545

-.119109*

.0200657

.0274337*

.0027277

.0301692*

.003089

Treaty (ln)

.3500274*

.0664361

1.214769*

.2560518

.5496883*

.0628047

.3290121

.0774111

Trade

-.0001913

.0003068

-.0060278

.0030896

.0009941*

.0004202

-.0006994

.0003788

GDP per capita
(ln)

.1482396*

.0220378

-.2465446

.2524978

.0235005

.0269345

.1270463*

.024372

.0182362

.0337553

.9047491*

.256568

-.0262297

.0227139

-.0266571

.0356361

Population (ln)

.1648962*

.0177808

-.4552569

.2264139

.0879157*

.0236055

.1733647*

.0187235

Technology

.1929986*

.055597

.9815896*

.4936424

.0294781

.0455365

.3103152*

.0998119

Urban
Population

.0016656

.0014282

-.0140813

.01396

.0016741

.0017172

.0004428

.00320389

FDI in flow

.0007421

.000429

.0052329

.0050234

.000689

.0012214

.0010631*

.0004491

.2149657*

.0488886

1.69794

.5196162

-

-

.3349334*

.0698122

Social
Development

Net ODA per
capital (ln)

N

2761

2761

1402

2255

Group N

122

122

75

100

Rsq.

.97

.20

.98

.97

Wald

6863.79

1431.52

4961.34

24959.77

_cons

-1.853739*

.3871687

-15.42592*

4.43186

.6498611

.4319603

-2.337453

.480906

Rhos

.8559366

.8698936

.543256

.6725326

.2981332

.9044333

.8697335

.8678687

*P < 0.05
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